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I. INTRODUCTION
Early last year, Canada chided Nigeria for publicly flogging a
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teenage mother under the shania, the Islamic code of law that governs
in the state of Zamfara.' President Obasanjo's rejoinder to Canada's
interference in Nigerian matters was non-confrontational but firm: "We
have a federal system. You come from a federal system of government.
Why can't your Prime Minister stop something in Quebec?"2 For the
benefit of the United States, he added, "There is the death penalty in
some [American] states and no death penalty in others."'
Not long after, on the eve of a well-publicized trade mission,
Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chritien faced intense pressure to
denounce China's record in human rights. At the time, he abruptly
remarked, 'We're not running China. They are running China."4 Along
similar lines, Mr. Chrtien had explained a few years earlier that he was
"not allowed to tell the premier of Saskatchewan or Quebec what to
do," and retorted, "So how am I supposed to tell the president of China
what to do?"' Examples abound which demonstrate that federalism
provides a variety of reasons for not complying with international
human rights law.6
If it is obvious that federalism affects the observance of
international rights laws, it is also apparent that international standards
pose special problems for nation-states like Canada and the United
States. Yet the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1. The woman, who claimed to have been raped, was found guilty of premarital
sex and sentenced to 100 lashes. See Alan Freeman, Nigeian Leader Doores Girl's
Caning, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 29, 2001, at A7. Her plight provoked an outcry in
Canada and a formal protest from the federal government. See ii
2. Id.
3. Id. More recently, a woman sentenced to death by stoning under the law of
sharia for the offence of adultery won a reprieve pending her appeal. The case, which
arose in Sokoto, Nigeria, has once more attracted international attention. In the
meantime, another woman charged with adultery was acquitted on the grounds that
a conviction requires four eyewitnesses to the adulterous act. See Rape Victim Appealr
Death ly Stoning, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 10, 2001, at Al 4; Sharia R knhg Leaves Hope
for Women in Nigeria, THE GLOBE & MAiL, Jan. 25, 2002, at A15; Margaret Wente,
Raped, Therefore Guih: Stone Her to Death, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 26, 2002, at A17.
4. Editorial, Mr. Chretie Shomld Speak up in China, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 9,
2001, at Al4.
5. Id.
6. See generalb Koren L. Bell, Note, From L&aardto Leader. Canadian Lessons on a Role
for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Haman ights Treaties, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 255 (2002) (providing a comparative analysis of Canadian and American
constraints on participation in human rights treaties).
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(ICCPR)7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)8 maintain that their provisions apply without
limitations or exceptions.9 Though unitary and federal states are not
similarly situated for purposes of compliance, it would have been
awkward for the Covenants to endorse a double standard for
"universal" entitlements."°  Even so, domestic constitutional
arrangements that divide authority between a national government and
its provinces or states cannot be as easily displaced as the ICCPR and
ICESCR suggest.
To this day, federalism remains a subject of vital concern in the
United States and Canada. Although the 1937 court-packing crisis gave
quietus to constraints on the expansion of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence of late has
expressed a re-awakened interest in state autonomy." Meanwhile, it is
7. Registered ex offido Mar. 23, 1976, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
[hereinafter ICCPR]; acceded to by Canada pursuant to Privy Council decision no.
1976-1156, May 18, 1976.
8. Registered ex offido Jan. 3, 1976, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 46, 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
[hereinafter ICESCRI; acceded to by Canada pursuant to Privy Council decision no.
1976-1156, May 18, 1976.
9. Article 50 of the ICCPR, smpra note 7, and Article 28 of the ICESCR, spra note
8, are identical and state that "[t]he provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to
all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions." ICCPR, mpra note 7,
art. 50 at 185; ICESCR, srpra note 8, art. 28 at 11.
10. Whether the Covenants should include a clause relieving federal governments
from responsibility for violations by their constituent states was controversial.
Proponents of such a clause maintained that the central government in many federal
states would lack the constitutional authority to force their constituent states to comply
with international law. Opponents argued that a special rule for federal states would
violate the principle of universality and create unequal status in relation to international
obligations between federal and unitary states. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 636-38 (1993)
(discussing these tensions).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal
civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the Brady Act, which directed state law
enforcement officers to temporarily participate in the administration of a federally
enacted regulatory scheme, offended the very principle of separate state sovereignty);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Congress's Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, marking the first time since 1937 that the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated federal legislation under the Commerce Clause); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government cannot compel the
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
doubtful that relations between the federal government and its
provinces could be described as comfortable at any point in Canada's
history."2 Under the smouldering threat of Quebec independence, the
irritants of federal union are ever prone to flare.' 3 For reasons that
might owe as much to the demographics and economic disparities of
Confederation as to the special case of Quebec, Canadian federalism is
volatile. North of the 49th parallel, the landscape on federal-provincial
relations is in constant motion.
On the international front, Canada boasts a shining example in
human rights, one that exceeds that of the United States.'4 Yet shadows
have darkened an image Canada would like to claim for herself; twice
in recent years, international monitors have complained that her
compliance with the Covenants has not met expectations. First, in its
concluding observations, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed displeasure with Canada's lack of
progress under the ICESCR. s Not long thereafter, the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), which oversees the ICCPR, stated dissatisfaction
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program for the disposal of waste
generated within their borders).
12. Seegexera/. MUST CANADA FAIl,? (Richard Simeon ed., 1977) (exploring the
possibility of a Canada without Quebec); THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? (R. Kent
Weaver ed., 1992) (exploring the origins and evolution of the "Canadian constitutional
crisis").
13. In 1995, a referendum in the province of Quebec almost secured a majority
in favour of "independence" from Canada. Not long thereafter, the federal
government was concerned enough to pose a package of three questions to the
Supreme Court of Canada on the legal status of a unilateral declaration of
independence by the province. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217 (explaining that there is no legal right to secede under the Constitution, but that
Quebec and the "rest of Canada" have a constitutional "duty to negotiate" the terms
of independence in the event of a clear majority vote by Quebeckers in favour of
independence on a clear referendum question). For an introduction to the role of
advisory opinions, or "references," in Canada's constitutional tradition, see PETER W.
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 224-29 (4th ed. 1997).
14. See Bell, sxpra note 6, at 256 (claiming that Canadian leadership contrasts with
the United States' "qualified adherence" to human rights treaties), 290 (arguing that
Canada offers the United States a constructive model, which reconciles federalism with
due respect for international human rights law).
15. Concluding Obnm'ations on Canada's Third Piodic Rtport, U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 57th Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.31
(1998) [hereinafter Conciuding Obsorations of CESCR]. See infra notes 245-47,257-60 and
accompanying text for further discussion.
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with this country's performance in a number of areas.16 At home,
advocates of international human rights grumbled that "a combination
of ignorance and apathy is probably an accurate description of the
attitude of Canadian society as a whole to the international human rights
treaty order's relevance to Canada itself."' 7 Put in muscular terms, this
country has needed "a normative kick in the pants for some time," and
"that is exactly what the two committees have given us."
' 8
Against that backdrop, this article explores the relationship between
federalism, treaties, and international rights under the Canadian
Constitution. A comment on comparative analysis precedes the
introduction to that project. Recognizing that the similarities and
differences that distinguish federal states offer a distinctive source of
insight, the discussion draws American parallels when feasible. Even so,
the article's main objective is to explain how Canada ratified and
implemented international instruments in the face of significant
restrictions on the national government's treaty power. 9 In general
terms, after analyzing a constitutional jurisprudence that subordinated
sovereignty in foreign relations to principles of federalism, the article
explores the process by which the constraints of doctrine were
overcome. In more detail, then, the plan is as follows: First, it is
imperative to outline Canada's status, historically, as a member of the
British Empire and then of the British Commonwealth. Far from
serving as a quaint reminder of a bygone era, this account is vital, for it
discloses that the Constitution neither granted nor intended Canada to
exercise a treaty power in her own name. Continuing with the
chronology, the next stage in constitutional history reveals the profound
effect gaps in Canada's sovereignty would have on the relationship
between federalism and treaties. Though the analysis focuses on the
Canadian jurisprudence, this part of the article closes with a comparison
of Attrney-Generalfor Canada v. Attorney.Generalfor Ontario (the Labour
16. Coneluding Observations on Canada's Fomrb Peiodic Rtport, U.N. Human Rights
Committee, 65th Session, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999) [hereinafter
Concluding Obsenvations of HRC. See infra note 243 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
17. Craig Scott, Canadas International Human R'gbts Obigations and Diadvataged
Members of Sode,: Finalb Into the Spotigbt?, 10 CONSTIT. FORUM 97, 105 (1999).
18. Id
19. See infra note 185 and accompanying text (providing a list of the most
significant human rights treaties ratified by Canada).
2002]
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Conventions Case)' and Missouri v. Holland." In each case, the question
was whether principles of federalism should prevent the respective
national governments from enacting domestic legislation to perform
treaty obligations.' The Privy Council, which was then Canada's final
court of appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court, did not answer that
question in the same way.
In Canada, constitutional limits on the federal government's treaty
power were answered by the process that is known in this country as
"co-operative federalism."'  The innovation is an example of the
creative but pragmatic solutions that define Canada's "organic"
constitutional tradition. If the implications for international rights are
of immediate interest, the broader point is that Canada has survived,
often against significant odds, because its institutions of federalism,
political as well as constitutional, have responded to exigency. In this
context, through a spirit of co-operation between the federal
government and the provinces, Canada has been able to ratify and
implement a significant number of human rights treaties.24 To
understand that dynamic, the second part of the article addresses two
themes. The first introduces co-operative federalism and shows how
principles of parliamentary government were adapted to meet the
demands of Canadian federalism. The second returns to the concerns
outlined above, that Canada has not met expectations in its compliance
with international standards; albeit in schematic terms, the discussion
considers whether federalism is to blame. At the end, the article offers
its own "concluding observations" about the relationship between
federalism and international human rights in Canada. Briefly, while
conceding that the division of powers between the federal government
and provinces is an element, it maintains that federalism is not the
greatest hurdle to the enforcement of international entitlements in this
country.
20. 11937] A.C. 326 (declaring federal legislation implementing treaty obligations
an unconstitutional encroachment on the jurisdiction of the provinces) [hereinafter
Labomr Coventionr Cue].
21. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding congressional legislation implementing treaty
obligations despite its implications for state autonomy).
22. See id; see alro Labour Convntions Case, [19371 A.C. 326.
23. See ifm notes 214-16 and accompanying text (providing an explanation of the
term).
24. See infra note 185.
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II. FEDERALISM AND TREATIES UNDER THE CANADIAN
CONSTITUTION
A. Revolution and Counter-Revolution
Both were under the auspices of the British Empire, yet America's
thirteen colonies and Canada's four founding provinces attained
independence at different times through different means.a2 Though
much of that history is well-treaded, Seymour Martin Upset's paradigm
of American revolution and Canadian "counter-revolution" is useful
because it draws attention to the distinction between a self-governing
colony and an independent nation.26 Two points bear particularly on the
history of federalism and treaties: first, Canada did not attain formal
independence until 1982, when the Constitution was "patriated," and
second, as a result, there are critical omissions in Canada's first
Constitution. It might surprise Americans to learn, for instance, that
to this day there is no domestic treaty power in the constitutional text."
The Dominion of Canada was created in 1867, when the United
Kingdom enacted the British North America Act (B.N.A. Act). 9 In this
25. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Eng.) [hereinafter
B.N.A. Act] joined four provinces in Confederation: Upper and Lower Canada (which
are, respectively, Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See id § 146
(conferring the power to admit Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and British
Columbia into the union); subsequently, federal legislation was enacted, in each case,
to admit Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta; Newfoundland was the last province
to become a part of Canada in 1949. For a summary of the complex statutory history
detailing the admission of provinces who joined after Confederation, see HOGG, rpra
note 13, at 39-44.
26. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1-18 (Routledge, Chapman &
Hall Inc. 1990) (identifying a variety of cultural social and political differences between
the two countries, beginning with their distinctive origins in "revolution" and
"counter-revolution").
27. Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (Eng.); tee infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text
(explaining what "patriation" means and why it is a significant event in Canadian
history).
28. But re infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (describing section 132 of the
1867 Constitution, which is referred to in this paper as the "empire treaty power").
29. See B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Eng.). Note that the B.N.A. Act was
renamed the Constitution Act, 1867 in the Canada Act, 1982, ira note 27, S 53(2).
To avoid the awkwardness of employing 1982's official name in an historical analysis,
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way, and by ordinary statute of the British Parliament, the colonies
which joined in union attained domestic powers of self-government
within the framework of the Empire. Albeit a key factor in this article,
the lack of authority to engage in foreign relations was not the only
aspect of the new nation's dependent status.' For instance, imperial
supremacy permitted the British government to annul Canadian
legislation; such powers of reservation and disallowance, which were
infrequently exercised, nonetheless textualized the hierarchical
relationship between Canada and Great Britain.31 Second, the Colonial
Laws Validity Act (CLVA) expressly prohibited the colonies from
enacting laws that were repugnant to imperial statutes.3 2 In part owing
to this statute, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council served as
Canada's final court of appeal until 1949." Third, as independence was
not within the contemplation of Britain or Canada at Confederation, the
1867 Constitution failed to provide for its own amendment. 4 Until
this paper preserves references to the B.N.A. Act, where appropriate. For an
explanation of the term "Dominion," see infra note 36.
30. See HOGG, supra note 13, at 47-48 (identifying other elements of dependency,
including Britain's authority to enact statutes extending to Canada, its power to appoint
Canada's Governor General, who is the monarch's representative in Canada, and
Canada's incapacity to legislate with extra-territorial effect).
31. SeeB.N.A. Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 55-57. In brief, section 56's power
of disallowance authorized the British Parliament to annul Canada's statutes;
meanwhile, reservation under section 55 contemplated that the "Queen's Assent" to
a Bill could be withheld and the legislation "reserved for the 'Signification of the
Queen's Pleasure."' Professor Hogg reports that disallowance only occurred once in
1873, that reservation was invoked twenty-one times but not once after 1878, and that
only six bills were denied the royal assent. See HOGG, sura note 13, at 48 n.4.
Moreover, by 1930 Great Britain expressly agreed not to exercise these powers. See ia
32. 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (Eng.) [hereinafter CLVA]. The CLVA had two
purposes: one was to acknowledge that the self-governing colonies were autonomous
on matters relating to received statute law and common lavr, a second, though, was to
establish the doctrine of repugnancy, which prohibited local legislatures from enacting
laws that were inconsistent with any imperial statute directly applicable to that
particular colony. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
34. Canada's first Prime Minister and one of its key "Fathers of Confederation,"
Sir John A. Macdonald, stated:
No one can look into futurity and say what will be the destiny of this
country. Changes come over nations and peoples in the course of ages. But,
so far as we can legislate, we provid thatfor all time to come, the sovereign of Great
Britain shall be the sovereign of British North America.
[Vol. 48:1
FEDERALISM
1982, Canada's Constitution was amended the same way it was
created-by ordinary statute of the British parliament.3"
As the world changed and the empire's lights began to dim, Britain's
"dominions" began to press for sovereign status.36 In 1926, the Balfour
Declaration announced that the United Kingdom and the dominions
are "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in
status" and "in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic
or external affairs."37 Enacted in 1931, the Statute of Westminster "
granted those countries independence by conferring sovereign power
in foreign relations, repealing the CLVA, and declaring that no British
statute would apply to a dominion except by express adoption. 9 Oddly,
though at her request, a key aspect of Canada's independence was
withheld. Repealing the CLVA and declaring that Canada was no longer
bound by imperial legislation created an anomaly. The 1867
Constitution was a curiosity because it functioned as a constitutional
instrument but was an ordinary statute, subject to amendment as such.'
By terminating the British Parliament's authority to legislate for Canada,
the Statute of Westminster empowered any or all of the parties to
Parliamentary Debates on Confederation, 3d Session, 8th Parliament of Canada 33
(Hunter, Rose & Co., Parliamentary Printing, 1865) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Confederation Debates].
35. As Hogg indicates, there is no explanation for the text's failure to include an
amending formula. He regards it as an "inescapable conclusion" that Canada's framers
were content for the imperial Parliament to play a role in amending the Constitution.
See HOGG, supra note 13, at 5.
36. Section 3 of the 1867 Constitution created "one Dominion in the name of
Canada." B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 3 (Eng.). As a descriptor, the term
"dominion" gained broader currency in the early 1900s to identify self-governing
members of the Empire which enjoyed a substantial degree of independence. When
the British Empire evolved into the British Commonwealth, those countries became
members of the Commonwealth. See HOGG, supra note 13, at 110-11.
37. HOGG, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added).
38. 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, %9 2,4 (Eng.).
39. See id. Those colonies named as "Dominions" under this legislation included
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and
Newfoundland. See id
40. But see Chief Justice Marshall's remarks many years earlier, in comparing a
written constitution and an ordinary statute: "Between these alternatives there is no
middle ground. The constitution [sic] is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2002]
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confederation to amend the Constitution unilaterally.41 To preserve its
status as a constitutional text, the Statute of Westminster exempted the
1867 Act from the grant of domestic sovereign status.42 Though the
United Kingdom was prepared to release Canada from the colonial
yoke, the federal government and provinces could not agree on an
amending formula, with the result that Canada continued to change its
Constitution through the British Parliament until 1982. 4-
It is also notable that appeals to the Privy Council were not
abolished before 1949. Though imperial judicial jurisdiction predated
the 1867 Constitution, no where did its written text authorize judicial
review to enforce the terms of federal union.' If institutional review
might have evolved in any case, the CLVA explains why Canada's
Constitution was interpreted by the Privy Council.4 Under section 2 of
the CLVA, domestic legislation which infringed the written terms of
federalism was ultra tins and subject to invalidation under the doctrine
of repugnancy.' Despite earlier efforts to abolish Privy Council appeals,
41. In the absence of an amending formula, the 1867 Constitution was protected
from alteration by the CLVA, which prohibited Canada's legislatures from enacting
statutes inconsistent with applicable British laws, including the 1867 Constitution. The
effect of the Statute of Westninister was to destroy the status of imperial statutes,
including the B.N.A. Act. See HOGG, smpra note 13, at 48.
42. Statute of Westminister, 1931,22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 7(1) (Eng.). Section 7(1)
stipulated that "[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal,
amendment or alteration of the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or to any
order, rule or regulation made thereunder." Id.
43. At the imperial conference of 1930, which predated the Statute of
Westminster, the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and all the dominions
agreed that the U.K. Parliament would not enact any statute applying to a dominion
except at its express request and with its consent. This agreement created a
constitutional convention which, in Canada's case, meant that the 1867 Constitution
would only be amended by the U.K. Parliament at Canada's request. That process for
amending the Constitution prevailed until 1982. See HOGG, supra note 13, at 62.
44. See, e.g., infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Constitution conferred exclusive powers on the federal and provincial legislatures, and
that the federal government was authorized to disallow provincial legislation).
45. Though the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is, in formal terms, an
advisory committee rather than a court, it served as the final court of appeal from
colonial courts, including Canada; as such, it decided the constitutionality of federal
and provincial legislation under the B.N.A. Act, an imperial statute subject to the
CLVA and its doctrine of repugnancy. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
46. Section 2 of the CLVA, reads, in part: "Any colonial law, which is or shall be
repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to the colony to which
[Vol. 48:1
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the Supreme Court of Canada did not become master of its own house,
and its own Constitution, until 1949.' In the circumstances, it is of little
surprise that the Privy Council's contributions have been hotly
debated.' Suffice to say, without joining issue on the point, that certain
principles were entrenched by the early 1930s, when Canada's newly
acquired sovereignty in foreign relations forced the courts to consider
the status of treaties under the Constitution's division of powers
between the federal government and the provinces.'
The fourth and final stage in progress toward independence did not
occur until 1982, the year Canada's Constitution was patriated and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms was added."0 Patriation, or repatriation,
is an incident of the first Constitution's failure to set a formula for its
own amendment; however, agreeing on and entrenching such a formula
at times appeared to pose an impossible challenge for the partners of
Canada's federal union." To pare a long story down, the impasse was
broken in 1982, when nine of ten provinces agreed to a patriation
package, and the federal government proceeded over Quebec's
objection.52 Since then, two attempts to remove that taint on its
such law may relate ... shall, to the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be
and remain absolutely void and inoperative." CLVA, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., c. 3, 5 2
(Eng.).
47. See genera/ HOGG, supra note 13, at 212-14 (providing a brief overview of the
history of Privy Council jurisdiction and the process which led to the abolition of
appeals in 1949).
48. See, e.g., Alan Cairns, The Judidal Committee and it Critics, 4 CAN. J. OF POL. SC.
301 (1971); see also infra note 164 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 121-65 and accompanying text.
50. See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (Eng.). The Charter is cited as Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, and Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982. As for independence
though, the British monarch remains Canada's head of state by choice. See B.N.A. Act,
1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 9 (declaring that "[t]he Executive Government and
Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the
Queen") and Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 41 (a) (Eng.) (requiring the unanimous consent
of the federal government and all provinces for any constitutional amendment relating
to "the office of the Queen").
51. For a summary of the protracted search for an amending formula, together
with an overview of the amending formulae which are now entrenched in the
Constitution see HOGG, supra note 13, at 61-101.
52. Former Prime Minister Trudeau's proposal to patriate the Constitution
unilaterally was opposed by eight of ten provinces, and was tested in the Supreme
Court of Canada. See Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753
[hereinafter Patiation Reference] (holding that unilateral patriation was legal but
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legitimacy by amending the Constitution domestically failed miserably.
5 3
For obvious reasons, patriation and the entrenchment of constitutional
rights mark a milestone in Canadian constitutional history.
B. Clothing the Bones of the Constitution4
Whatever disagreements may erupt over its interpretation, there can
be no doubt of the treaty power's significance in the U.S. Constitution."
Canada's 1867 text, by contrast, made no provision for a treaty power
because neither the British Empire nor its Dominion foresaw the need
for one. 6 The subject of treaties is addressed but once, in a group of
sections collected under the heading "Miscellaneous Provisions.""
There, section 132 granted the federal government the authority to
perform obligations undertaken in treaties between Great Britain and
other countries."8 In specific terms, the "empire treaty power"
authorized the Parliament and Government of Canada to exercise "all
unconstitutional in the conventional sense). Subsequent negotiations produced a
consensus that excluded the province of Quebec, and that was tested in the courts too.
See Re: Objection by Quebec to Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] S.C.R.
793 [hereinafter Quebec Veto Refennce] (rejecting Quebec's claim of veto over
constitutional amendments). Two well known books documenting this momentous
episode in Canadian history are ROY J. ROMANOW ET. AL., CANADA . . .
NOTWITHSTANDING: THE MAKING OF THE CONsTITUTION, 1976-1982 (1984) and
AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT
(Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., 1983).
53. See general PATRICK MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE INSIDE STORY (1991)
(providing an insider's account of the Meech Lake Accord's failed attempt to bring
Quebec back into Canada's constitutional family); THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD,
THE REFERENDUM, AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick
Monahan, eds., 1993) (essay collection discussing the Charlottetown Accord, a
comprehensive package of constitutional reforms which were submitted to Canadians
in a nationwide referendum).
54. See infra note 112 and accompanying text (citing Lord Haldane's approval of
Lord Watson's defence of provincial autonomy).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make
treaties, by and with the advice of the Senate, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur); and U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring all treaties made under the
authority of the United States to be the supreme law of the land).
56. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining that Canada lacked





Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of [Canada]
or ofany Province thervof, as Part of the British [Empire], towards Foreign
Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign
Countries." 9 On its face, section 132 did not empower the federal
government to make treaties in its own name, or to implement such
treaties domestically. As a result, when the Statute of Westminster
rendered the empire treaty power moribund, Canada was left with yet
another textual gap in its Constitution.'
Canada's Constitution might be thought of as a hybrid or
"mongrel," which borrowed elements from the British and American
traditions and then adapted each to local circumstances.
6' Evidence of
this ambivalence can be found in the preamble, which states the desire
of its founding provinces to be 'federalyl united.. .under the Crown of the
United Kingdom of [Great Britain] and [Ireland], with a Constitution
similar in Prindple to that of the United Kingdom."
62 Canada adopted Britain's
system of parliamentary democracy which is based, in the main, on the
unwritten principles and conventions of responsible 
government.63
59. Id. (providing the full text of section 132) (emphasis added).
60. Note that although the Statute of Westminster is part of Canada's
Constitution, it conferred independence in foreign relations without creating a treaty
power. See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 52(2)(b) (Eng.).
61. The following exchange during the Parliamentary debates on Confederation
illustrates the point:
Hon. Mr. Sgmour-Among all the wild republican theories of our neighbours,
they have never proposed to change the Constitution in this manner.
My hon. friends will say that this proposed change is neither American nor
English.
Several Hon. Members-It is Canadian. (Hear, hear).
Hon. Mr. Sgmor-No, it is neither one nor the other; it is a mongrel
Constitution. (Laughter)
Confederation Debates, supra note 34, at 205.
62. Appendix (providing the full text of the Preamble) (emphasis added). The
ambivalence is that Canada chose federal union and a written constitution which
claimed to emulate that of the United Kingdom, a unitary state with an unwritten
constitution.
63. The rules and principles of responsible government represent another gap in
the 1867 Constitution. In this, Canada simply adopted the British practice, which is to
treat the rules which define relations between the executive and legislative branches
as part of the unwritten conventions of government. Other conventions, which relate
to principles of federalism, are distinctively Canadian. For a brief description of
conventions, see HOGG, supra note 13, at 19-27.
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Parliamentary supremacy is the fundamental principle of British
constitutionalism, and it meant, historically, that the legislature had the
right "to make or unmake any law whatever."" As Chief Justice Holt
once quipped, "An Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may
do several things that look pretty odd."6s In Canada's case,
parliamentary sovereignty was diluted, of necessity, by local
circumstances; neither imperial supremacy nor a plan for divided
jurisdiction could be squared with the concept of one source of
legislative sovereignty.66 Moreover, judicial review of statutes is a
contradiction in terms with the principle that Parliament can do no legal
wrong."' Owing, as well, to the preamble's "similar in Principle"
declaration, there is no structured separation of powers as provided in
the U.S. Constitution's first three articles, and little in Canada's
Constitution about the executive power or the judicial branch.6" As
discussed below, however, the relationship between the executive and
legislative branches has immense implications both for the treaty power
and the advent of co-operative federalism.69
64. For a classic statement of the principle, see A.V. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-40 (10th ed. 1959) (stating that
Parliament may make or unmake any law whatever, and that no body or person is
recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament).
65. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1601, 1602 (K.B. 1908).
66. For a discussion of Imperial oversight, see spra note 31 and accompanying
text. As well, under Canada's division of powers between the federal government and
the provinces, neither government is supreme because the powers of each are limited
by the powers given the other.
67. Though the notion that courts can review and invalidate the actions of the
legislature is incompatible with the concept ofparliamentary supremacy, judicial review
evolved early in Canada's history. See HOGG, smpra note 13, at 256. Otherwise,
however, legislative sovereignty described relations between individuals and the state;
with limited exceptions for language and the status of denominational schools, the
1867 Constitution failed to create constitutional rights. See B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31
Vict., c. 3, §§ 93, 133 (Eng.).
68. See generally B.N.A. Act 1867, 30 & 31, Vict., c.3, % 9-16 (dealing with
executive powers and, primarily, with the office of the Governor General, the Queen's
representative in Canada); see also B.N.A. Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, % 96-101
(addressing the appointment and tenure of judges, and authorizing the establishment
of a "General Court of Appeal"). This resulted in the creation of a statutory Supreme
Court of Canada in 1875. Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, 1875, ch. 11,1875 S.C.
(Can.)).
69. See the discussion infra on pages 34-43.
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The most important provisions in the 1867 Constitution are sections
91 and 92, which divide legislative authority between the federal
government and the provinces.7 ° There, Canada adopted the American
ideas of a written constitution and a federal union, though not without
considerable forethought." In doing so, the "Fathers of Confederation"
were especially influenced by two historical forces: first and foremost
was the existence of significant cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity
among the four founding provinces, and second was the U.S. Civil
War.72 As to the latter, a recurring theme in the Confederation Debates
was the Fathers' determination to avoid the glaring defect of the
American Constitution-states' rights or state sovereignty.
73 Though
challenged over the years, the dominant vision of Canadian federalism
favoured a strong central government with paramount powers, and
provinces that would enjoy autonomy, but only on matters of purely
local interest.74 To clarify those arrangements, appease minority
populations, and avert the conflicts that had almost torn the United
States apart, the framers created two lists of constitutional authority:
section 91 of the 1867 Constitution defining the federal government's
legislative powers, and section 92 defining the authority granted to the
70. See Appendix (setting out the texts of sections 91 and 92 in full).
71. See Confederation Debates, supra note 34, at 28 (declaring, per Sir John A.
Macdonald, that "[lit is the fashion now to enlarge on the defects of the Constitution
of the United States," but that Canada had avoided "the defects which time and events
have shown to exist in the American Constitution").
72. See id (explaining, per Sir John A. Macdonald, that a legislative union or
unitary state was rejected in favour of a federal union in order to respect and secure
the local autonomy of Quebec's French-Canadian minority, as well as to alleviate the
concerns of the maritime provinces).
73. See id. at 33. The U.S. Constitution was a negative model, because state rights
were seen as a "great source of weakness" and "the cause of the disruption of the
United States." Id. As Sir John A. Macdonald explained:
Ever since the [American] union was formed the difficulty of what is called
'State Rights' has existed, and this has had much to do in bringing on the
present unhappy war in the U.S.... They declared by their Constitution that
each state was a sovereignty in itself .... Here we have adopted a different
system.
Id
74. Thus, Sir John A. Macdonald added, "we have strengthened the General
Government. We have given the General legislature all the great subjects of legislation
.... We have thus avoided the great source of weakness which has been the cause of
the disruption of the U.S." Id
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provinces.7" In an attempt to foreclose jurisdictional disputes, the texts
of sections 91 and 92 specify that each level of government enjoys and
exercises exclusive powers.76
Even so, the text signals the intent to create a hierarchical
relationship between the federal government and the provinces. For
instance, somewhat parallel to the imperial power of disallowance
discussed above, section 90 granted the federal government the
authority to disallow provincial legislation." As for the division of
powers, section 91 confers general and enumerated powers on the
national government.7" Separate from and introductory to the powers
expressly granted to the federal government is a clause known as the
Pogg Clause, which grants Parliament the authority to legislate for the
"peace, order, and good government" of Canada. 9 This remarkable
source of authority is qualified only by the competing "Classes of
Subjects" assigned exclusively to the provinces under section 92 and
appears, therefore, to be residuary in nature.' In addition, section 91
declares that "for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the
Generality of the foregoing Terms of this section," the federal
government's authority extends to twenty-nine enumerated headings of
power.' To conclude, section 91(29), which is also known as the
75. See Appendix (providing the full text of sections 91-92).
76. See id. Thus, the introductory clause of section 91 states that Canada can
legislate on ' /Matters not coming within the ... subjects assigned... exc/dsive# to the
... [p]rovinces; . . . [and that] the exclui'e [ljegislaive [ajuthority of the [federal]
Parliament... extends" to certain subjects which are then listed. Appendix (providing
text of section 91) (emphasis added). By the same token, the heading which introduces
section 92 identifies the exclusive powers of provincial legislatures. See Appendix
(providing text of section 2). The section declares that each legislature may "exclusie#
make [ljaws in relation to" the then listed enumerated categories. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Eng.). Though the federal
government disallowed provincial legislation with some frequency in the early years of
Confederation, the power has not been invoked since 1943 and would, today, be
viewed as highly inappropriate and perhaps even unconstitutional in the conventional
sense. For a brief description see HOGG, smPra note 13, at 120-21.
78. See Appendix.
79. Id The Pogg Clause is also referred to as the Pogg Power and as the general
power.
80. See id
81. Id Three of section 91's most significant enumerated powers are: section 91(2)
The Regulation of Trade and Commerce; section 91(15) Banking, Incorporation of
Banks and the Issue of Paper Money; and section 91(27) The Criminal Law, except the
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Deeming Clause, states that any "Matter" included in the enumerated
"Classes of Subjects" is deemed not to fall within section 92(16), which
grants the provinces jurisdiction over "all Matters of a merely local or
private Nature in the Province."'
Canada's 1867 Constitution is not only a hybrid, but an agreement
forged of compromise. As a result, the textual indicia of federal
paramountcy are complicated by section 92, which creates a competing
list of the exclusive powers allocated to the provinces.' While section
92 was intended to prescribe and limit their powers, the list has
protected and enhanced the constitutional status of the provinces over
time.'4 Albeit considerably shorter and without a direct analogue to the
Pogg Clause, section 92's catalogue of powers offset section 91's list,
and generated a jurisprudence which, over the years, searched to find
and maintain equilibrium between the two levels of government.
8 5 A
comparative pause might illustrate the textual significance of the
Constitution's two lists. From a Canadian perspective, it is curious that
the U.S. Constitution failed to juxtapose federal and state powers in a
way that resembles sections 91 and 92. As the American Constitution's
purpose was to establish national institutions that would be functional
as well as legitimate, only those powers expressly delegated to national
institutions were removed from the states, with the residue remaining
within their jurisdiction.86
As with the thirteen U.S. states, the provinces predated
Confederation, but federal union likely could not have been achieved
without textual assurances of local autonomy.8" French-speaking and
Atlantic Canada sought written promises as a form of self-defence
against the populous English-speaking province of Upper Canada,
Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in
Criminal Matters. See id
82. Id at % 91(29), 92(16).
83. The two most important headings of power are section 92(13) Property and
Civil Rights in the Province, and section 92(16) Generally all Matters of a merely local
or private Nature in the Province. See id
84. See infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
85. See Appendix.
86. The Tenth Amendment confirms that: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 71-72.
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which was expected to dominate the national government." In any case,
given the Dominion's status within the Empire, the terms of union also
needed to prescribe the powers of the provinces.89 Over time, however,
a Constitution that was designed to remedy the perceived defects of the
U.S. model would be transformed by a jurisprudence that effectively
treated the provinces and federal government as co-equals.' Meanwhile,
national institutions rose in the United States;91 in hindsight, the
"invisible radiations from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment"
provided less protection for state autonomy than section 92's list of
exclusive powers has for Canada's provinces.92
It could not have been easy for the Privy Council to interpret the
1867 Constitution. Section 91 failed to define the relationship between
the federal government's general and enumerated powers. As a matter
of statutory construction, interpreting the Pogg Clause literally was
impossible, because to read it as a grant of general, unlimited power
88. See, e.g., B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92 (granting the provinces
exclusive jurisdiction over sixteen enumerated subjects), 93 (protecting the status of
denominational schools), § 133 (guaranteeing certain language rights) (Eng.); see alro
B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, % 21-36 (Eng.) (establishing Canada's Senate).
Though it has never functioned as such, the Senate was intended to represent and
protect the interests of Canada's regions, smaller provinces, and minority populations.
See PATRICK MONAHAN, CONSITUTIONAL LAW 83 (1997).
89. The purpose of the 1867 Constitution was dual-to grant Canada significant
powers of self-government within the framework of the Empire and to establish the
terms of union of the confederating colonies. From an imperial perspective, the
provinces were British colonies too, and their powers and status in relation to Britain
also required definition.
90. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
91. The point is intuitive and arises from this line of reasoning. In Canada, the
federal government was intended to be paramount, but the constitutional text
generated a significant list of provincial powers which were directly juxtaposed with
those granted the federal government. By contrast, as the American text only granted
the federal government those powers expressly delegated to it, state powers did not
require delineation, for all other authority remained with them. Under the Canadian
Constitution, the powers of the federal government and provinces are more
symmetrical, and that has given the provinces a stronger textual claim for challenging
federal jurisdiction than their American state counterparts can make. See infra notes
183-84 and accompanying text (analyzing this aspect of Missouri v. Holland, 525 U.S.
416 (1920)).
92. Missouri v. Holland, 525 U.S. at 434 (Holmes, J.). But see supra note 11
(acknowledging the rise of antifederalism, both under the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment, in the U.S. Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence).
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would render pointless the enumerated clauses which followed. In turn,
treating the twenty-nine headings as the primary source of federal
jurisdiction would obfuscate the scope and content of the general
clause. To complicate the task of constitutional interpretation, reading
section 91 against section 92 was also problematic, because the two lists,
which were supposed to grant each level of government exclusive
jurisdiction, contained substantial elements of overlap.9 Nor was it
helpful that the Privy Council treated the Constitution as an ordinary
statute, which meant that the intent of the framers played little or no
role in the text's interpretation.94
Three themes in Canada's history of constitutional jurisprudence
bear particularly on the fate of a post-Westminster treaty power, and
each favoured the rise of provincial authority against the federal
government. First, from the outset, the Privy Council interpreted the
text in a way that avoided or minimized conflicts between the terms of
sections 91 and 92." Though true to the principle of exclusive powers,
this method of interpretation necessarily compromised the concept of
paramountcy. The reason is that in cases of overlap, it was impossible
for federal paramountcy to co-exist with the principle of exclusive
provincial power. In an early and leading decision, Citizens Insurance Co.
of Canada v Parsons,96 Sir Montague Smith pondered a number of
conflicts between the two lists, and concluded that section 92's headings
of authority could not be absorbed in those granted the federal
government.9" Far wiser, he decided, that the "two sections be read
93. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Can. v. Parsons, [1881-1882] 7 A.C. 96,108-09 (Sir
Montague Smith) (providing concrete examples of the text's failure to create exclusive
compartments of legislative authority).
94. See, e.g., Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, [1887] A.C. 575, 579 (stating that the
Lords "must treat the provisions of the Act in question by the same methods of
construction and exposition they apply to other statutes"). But see Edwards v. Att'y
Gen. for Can., [1930] A.C. 124, 136 (Lord Sankey) (stating that the 1867 Act "planted
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits").
95. Examples of conflict or overlap include section 91(26) (granting exclusive
authority over "Marriages and Divorce"), and section 92(12) (granting the provinces
exclusive jurisdiction over "The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province'); section
91(3) (authorizing the federal government to raise money "by any mode or system of
taxation") and section 91(2) (empowering the provinces to raise revenue through
"direct Taxation within the Province"). See Appendix.
96. [1881] A.C. 96.
97. See id. Smith stated that:
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together, and the language of one interpreted, and, where necessary,
modified by that of the other.""8 In that way, the Privy Council offered
a "reasonable and practical construction of the language of the sections,
so as to reconcile the respective powers they contain, and give effect to
all of them."'" In principle then, Ciizens Insurance Co. of Canada held that
the integrity of section 92's exclusive powers could only be preserved
by reading section 91 restrictively, thereby tempering the principle of
paramountcy."
A second point is that gaps in legislative authority were impossible,
both institutionally and ideologically, under the British principle of
parliamentary supremacy. Although Canada's sovereignty was qualified
by its status within the Empire, the Privy Council made it clear that its
domestic legislative authority was unlimited."0 ' Not only was Canada
supreme under the terms of the 1867 Constitution, the provinces were
as sovereign in their areas of jurisdiction under section 92 as the federal
government was under section 91. For instance, in Hodge v. TbeQueen, °2
Sir Barnes Peacock explained that the Constitution conferred powers on
the provinces "as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by
[Nlotwithstanding this endeavour to give pre-eminence to the dominion
parliament in cases of a conflict of powers, it is obvious that in some cases
where this apparent conflict exists, the legislature could not have intended
that the powers exclusively assigned to the provincial legislatures should be
absorbed in those given to the dominion parliament.
Id at 108.
98. Id. at 109.
99. Ia
100. The precise question to answer in CitiVxs Insurance Co. of Canada was whether
provincial insurance legislation was invalid as an encroachment on any one of several
enumerated headings in section 91. See id To invalidate provincial legislation that
regulated contracts, which were entirely intra-provincial, would have been quite
unreasonable on any view of federalism. By the same token, the U.S. government's
authority under the Commerce Clause does not extend to purely local matters and is
limited to the regulation of interstate commerce or activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
101. In Att.y Gen. of Ontario P. Atty Gen. for Canada, [1912 A.C. 571, Earl
Loreburn, L.C., stated that under the 1867 Constitution "the powers distributed
between the Dominion on the one hand and the provinces on the other hand cover
the whole area of self-government within the whole area of Canada." Id at 581.
Moreover, he added that "[ilt would be subversive of the entire scheme and policy of
the Act to assume any point of internal self-government was withheld from Canada."
I
102. [1883] A.C. 117.
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section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power
possessed and could bestow.""0 3 Within section 92, he continued, "the
local legislature is supreme.""" This is significant because far from being
subject to the federal government's paramount powers, the provinces
began to emerge in the jurisprudence as its co-equal.05
Provincial autonomy is the third key principle of interpretation to
emerge in the period leading up to Canada's independence in foreign
relations. This principle is most frequently associated with Lord Watson
and his judgment in the Local Prohibition Case."1 In the ongoing
squabbles between the federal government and provinces over
jurisdiction to regulate the trade and traffic in liquor, the LocalProhibition
Case gave exceptional credence to the vulnerability of provincial
autonomy, were the Pogg Clause to be granted an expansive
interpretation. There, Lord Watson stressed that the federal
government's general' power "ought to be strictly confined to such
matters as are unquestionably of Canadian interest and importance, and
ought not to trench upon [valid] provincial legislation . .. [under]
section 92." "°7 He continued by indicating that "[t]o attach any other
construction to the general power which, in stmppkment of [the federal
government's] enumerated powers, would.., not only be contrary to
the intendment of the Act, but would practically destroy the autonomy
of the provinces. ' '  If the language of "peace, order, and good
government" is sufficient to transfer matters of local interest to the
Dominion, he declared, "there is hardly a subject enumerated in
[section] 92" that would be safe from expropriation by section 91."
103. Id at 132.
104. Id
105. See also Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Can. v. Receiver Gen. of New
Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437 (Lord Watson) (stating that:
Mhe object of the [British North America] Act was neither to weld the
provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central
authority, but to create a federal government in which they should all be
represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which
they had a common interest, each province retaining its independenre and atonomy.
Id at 441 (emphasis added)).
106. See Att'y Gen. for Ont. v. Att'y Gen. for the Dominion of Can., [1896] A.C.
348 [hereinafter Local Prohibition Case].
107. Id at 360.
108. Id (emphasis added).
109. Id at 361.
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The reality of interpretation under Canada's division of powers is
that granting authority to one level of government subtracts it from the
other.' Necessarily, then, by enhancing the status of the provinces, the
Privy Council constrained the federal government's powers under
section 91. Not only did the Local Prohibition Case signal that the general
power should be strictly confined-Lord Watson also suggested that
the Pogg Clause lacked independent substantive content and was, at
best, a helpmate to section 91's enumerated powers."'
Lord Haldane, who figured prominently in the next line of Pogg
cases, would eulogize that "Lord Watson put clothing upon the bones
of the Constitution, and so covered them over with living flesh...
[that] the provinces weir recognized as of equal authority co-ordinate with the
Dominion.""' 2 In his own right as a Privy Council judge, Lord Haldane
had the opportunity, in a 1920s trilogy of cases, to advance the novel
proposition that the Pogg Clause only applies in national emergencies."'
In each case, the federal government's regulation included activities that
were intra-provincial in nature." 4 Speaking through Lord Haldane, the
110. This follows from the principles of exhatwtfiners and exdriweness. As seen
above, exhautiveness means either the federal government or the provinces are
empowered to legislate. See Apra text accompanying note 99. Under the theory of
excduivness, either level of government can encroach on the jurisdiction of the other.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text. In cases of overlap, the courts must choose
between the federal government and the provinces; once one level of government is
empowered to legislate, the other is precluded, except in cases where a form of
concurrent power applies.
111. Local Prohibition Case, [18961 A.C. at 360-61. At the same time, the Local
Prohibition Case introduced the concept of "national dimensions," which describes
subjects of legislation which, "in their origin local and provincial," subsequently attain
"such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion" as to justify legislation
under the general power. Id See inqfa note 181 and accompanying text.
112. Lord Haldane, The Judial Committee of the Prity Couneil, 1 CAMBRIDGE L. J.
143, 150 (1921-1922) (emphasis added).
113. See In n The Bd. of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (invalidating federal
legislation aimed at hoarding and profiteering); Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co. v. Man.
Free Press Co., [1923] A.C. 695 (invalidating wartime legislation to control the price
and supply of newsprint); and Toronto Elec. Comm'rs v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396
(invalidating federal labour legislation as an encroachment on section 92(13), allocating
property and civil rights generally to the provinces).
114. In Board of Commerce Act, for instance, by prohibiting hoarding and
profiteering from the "necessaries of life" beyond an amount reasonably required for
household consumption or business purposes, the federal government attempted to
regulate activities that were indisputably local. Se Bd ofCommnceAct, [1922] 1 A.C. at
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Privy Council responded that short of war, pestilence, nationwide
intemperance or other forms of dire peril, the Pogg Power was
unavailable to the federal government; otherwise section 91's general
clause could swallow up the powers allocated to the provinces." 5 Under
this view, the enumerated headings of sections 91 and 92 are exhaustive
of federal jurisdiction, except "in a sufficiently great emergency arising
out of war"; in such circumstances, the Pogg Clause implies a temporary
power "to deal adequately with that emergency for the safety of the
Dominion as a whole.""' 6 Though it lacks grounding in the opening
words of section 91, Lord Haldane's emergency doctrine persists in
Canada's division of powers jurisprudence." 7
As noted above, Canada's Constitution did not equip her, textually,
for independence in foreign relations."' By 1931, the year the Statute of
Westminster was enacted, the Privy Council had established that the
provinces were sovereign under section 92, and that section 91 should
be read restrictively to protect provincial autonomy."9 At the time, the
status of the Pogg Clause was unclear, because the emergency doctrine
sat alongside earlier precedent suggesting that the general power
authorized Parliament to fill gaps in the division of powers, and even to
address issues which had attained national dimensions. 2 ' Once the
248-49. Subsequently, the statute challenged in Fort Frances controlled the price and
supply of newsprint paper throughout the country and, in doing so, affected activities
that were likewise and ordinarily within provincial jurisdiction. See Fort Frances P &
Paper Co., [1923] A.C. at 310-11. Finally, the legislation at issue in Toronto Eectric
Commissioners regulated labour disputes, whether the industry was inter- or intra-
provincial. See Toronto Eke. Comm'rs, [1925] A.C. at 398-401.
115. Compare Bd ofCommen-eAt, [1922] A.C. at 200 (suggesting that war or famine
would constitute an emergency) with Toronto Eke. Comm rs, [1925] A.C. at 412 (citing
the evil of intemperance and an epidemic of pestilence as sufficient to ground the
general power).
116. Fort Frances P & Paper Co., [19231 A.C. at 705.
117. See, e.g., Reference re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 (upholding
federal wage and price controls, but only as a temporary response to a national
emergency); see also R. v. Crown Zellerbach of Can. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (articulating
the elements of the Pogg doctrine which govern today, including the emergency
doctrine).
118. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
119. See sipra note 37 and accompanying text.
120. The gap case isJohn Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (upholding
federal authority to regulate federal corporations, in the absence of any enumerated
power, under the Pogg Clause); see als Russell v. The Queen, [1881] A.C. 829, 841
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Statute of Westminster granted Canada independence in foreign
relations, the question was whether and where a treaty power would be
situated in the division of powers.
C The Ship of State's Watertight Compartments'2'
Absent an amending formula, it was problematic for Canada simply
to add a provision to the Constitution which would create a treaty
power. At the same time, there was some logic in devolving the empire
treaty power to the federal government, as section 132 authorized the
Parliament and government of Canada to perform the treaty obligations,
not only of the federal government, but of the provinces as well.' But
that is not what happened."2 As with the Pogg Clause's emergency
doctrine, the constitutional status of treaties evolved in a trilogy of cases
decided in the 1930s: the Aeronautics Reference,'24 the Radio Reference,"' and
the Labour Conventions Case.'26
Air travel did not exist at the time of Confederation, and therefore
constituted a true "gap" in the text's exhaustive allocation of powers
between the federal government and the provinces. 27 In the Aeronautics
Reference, the Privy Council did not rely on the general power, but chose
a different reason for granting legislative authority over aerial navigation
to the federal government.' Following World War I, a Convention
relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation was presented at the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and was duly signed and ratified by the
(suggesting that the federal government alone can deal with questions of general
concern on which uniformity of legislation is desirable); Local Prohibition Case, [1896]
A.C. 348, 361 (restricting the scope of the Pogg Clause, but also allowing it to
encompass matters which are provincial in origin and later attain national dimensions).
121. See Labour Conwentions Care, [1937] A.C. 326, 354.
122. See B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 132 (Eng.).
123. Parliamentary democracies in the British tradition draw a distinction between
making treaties and performing treaty obligations. See infra notes 204-08 and
accompanying text.
124. [1932] A.C. 54 (upholding federal legislation asserting jurisdiction over
aeronautics in Canada).
125. [1932] A.C. 304 (upholding federal jurisdiction to regulate radio
communications).
126. [19371 A.C. 326.
127. SeeJohn Deere Plow v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330.
128. See Aeonauics Reference, [1932] A.C. at 63.
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allied and associated powers, including Canada. 29 Subsequently, His
Majesty ratified the Convention on behalf of the British Empire on June
1, 1922.1" Pursuant to the Convention, the federal government enacted
the Air Board Act, which provided for the general and comprehensive
regulation of aerial navigation nationwide.13' Though the statute
appeared to fall within the terms of section 132, its constitutionality was
tested in a reference which was ultimately heard by the Privy Council.'
In allowing the appeal and upholding federal authority, Lord Sankey
noted that "while the Court should be jealous in upholding the Charter
of the Provinces," the "real object" of the 1867 Constitution was to give
the central government "those high functions and almost sovereign powers by
which uniformity of legislation might be secured" on all issues of
common concern to the provinces "as members of a constituent
whole."' 33 Consequently, he rejected the submission, which had been
urged on the Privy Council, to carve the subject of air transport up
between sections 91 and 92.""4 Instead, he concluded, "[I]t is proper to
take a broader view of the matter than to rely on forced analogies or
piecemeal analysis." 3 ' Although the federal government could claim the
authority to perform Canada's obligations under the Convention by
"piecing together" its enumerated powers under section 91, this was
unnecessary because section 132 confers "the full power to do all that
is legislatively necessary" for that purpose.3 6 Moreover, as to any
aspects of air travel not covered by the empire treaty power, Lord
Sankey held that the legislative authority "must necessarily belong to the
Dominion under its power to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of Canada."' 37 In his view, aerial navigation was a "class of
129. See id at 62-64 (explaining the genesis of the Aerial Navigation Convention
and the federal government's legislative response).
130. See id at 63.
131. See id
132. See id. at 62 (explaining that the Supreme Court of Canada had held that, as
enacted, the legislation was unconstitutional); id. at 64 (explaining how the challenge
arose).
133. Id at 71 (emphasis added).
134. See id at 74.
135. Id
136. Id at 77 (mentioning the federal government's exclusive authority under
section 91 over (2) The Regulation of Trade and Commerce, (5) Postal Service, and
(7) Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence); see also Appendix.
137. Aeronauics Reference, [1932] A.C. at 77.
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subject which has attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic
of the Dominion," and therefore fell within federal jurisdiction.'
38
The Radio Reference,139 which was decided later the same year, added
a new wrinkle."4 As with air travel, radio communications did not exist
in 1867, and likewise, could be regarded as a true gap in the division of
powers. 4' In this case, however, federal jurisdiction could not be
claimed under section 132 because Canada attended the International
Radiotelegraph Convention of 1927 in her own right, and the Canadian
Parliament ratified the resulting Convention in her own name on July
12, 1928.42 As a result, the federal government lacked the authority
under section 132 to enact legislation implementing its international
obligations. Once again however, the Privy Council rejected the
suggestion that the power to regulate could be divided up between the
federal government and the provinces.' 43
In upholding federal regulatory authority over radio
communications, Viscount Dunedin remarked that the idea that Canada
might ever enter into agreements with a foreign power was "quite
unthought of in 1867," and it could hardly be expected, in such a
situation, that "such a matter should be dealt with in explicit words
either in section 91 or section 92."'" As a matter of logic, he then stated
that, "Being, therefore, not mentioned explicitly in either section 91 or
section 92, such legislation falls within the general words at the opening
of section 91." s "In fine," he continued, although the Convention was
not a section 132 treaty, "their Lordships think that it comes to the
same thing."'" As far as the Privy Council was concerned, the result in
the Radio Reference was based on "what may be called the pre-eminent
138. Id
139. [1932] A.C. 304
140. See id (upholding federal jurisdiction to regulate radio communications).
141. But see Appendix (citing section 92(10) which excludes "Local Works and
Undertakings" from provincial jurisdiction, including (a) Lines of Steam or other
Ships, Railways, Canals, Teegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings gonnectinA the Province
with any other or others of the Province' (emphasis added)).
142. Radio Reference, [19321 A.C. at 305-07 (summarizing the history of Canada's
participation in the Convention).
143. Seeid. at 311.
144. Id. at 312.




claims of section 91."" Canada as a whole would be answerable to its
co-signatories for implementing the obligations undertaken, and it
follows that "the Dominion should pass legislation which should apply
to all the dwellers in Canada."' 48
If the Aeronautics Reference rested on section 132 and echoed
concerns about the implications for section 92 of enhancing the general
power, the Radio Reference was remarkably sure-footed in its conclusion
that treaties made by Canada in her own name are analogous to empire
treaties, and that the power to implement their obligations domestically
must belong to the federal government. In combination, the Aeronautics
and Radio References decisions indicated that the Privy Council was
prepared to convert section 132's anachronistic terms into a general
power, held by the federal government, to make treaties and implement
their obligations domestically."' In such circumstances, it remains
unsettled whether the Labour Conventions Case, the third of the treaty
decisions, represented a sea change in the Privy Council's conception of
Canada's post section 132 status, or is better understood as a
retrenchment of principles of federalism. There, in striking federal
legislation implementing obligations Canada had undertaken pursuant
to the International Labour Organization, Lord Atkin dreamily
remarked that, "[w]hile the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and
into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which
are an essential part of her original structure."'" Shortly put, the Labour
Conventions Case held that the federal government could not usurp the
authority of the provinces by purporting to implement treaty obligations
that would otherwise violate the division of powers set out in sections
91 and 92. s'
To be sure, there was an important distinction between aeronautics
and radio, on the one hand, and labour legislation on the other. While
each of the former revealed a gap in the division of powers, issues
relating to labour and employment fell within the uncontested
147. Id. at 317.
148. Id at 313.
149. See .upra note 123 (signaling the distinction between the power to enter into
a treaty and the power to implement or enforce its terms as a matter of domestic law).
150. Labour Conventions Case, [1937] A.C. at 354 (declaring federal legislation
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jurisdiction of the provinces under section 92(13)."2 Still, to conclude
otherwise, Lord Atkin needed to distinguish the Privy Council's earlier,
friendly overtures toward a federal treaty power. As for the Aeronautics
Reference, he stated that section 132 had been dispositive there, and went
on to dismiss Lord Sankey's further remarks about the general power as
obiter.'5 3 Conceding that the Radio Reference "appears to present more
difficulty," Lord Atkin claimed that the true ground of the decision was
that communications fell under a heading that was expressly excluded
from provincial jurisdiction."' In summary, he held that "neither case
affords a warrant for holding that legislation to perform a Canadian
treaty is exclusive within the Dominion legislative power."'55
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, Lord Atkin vigorously
rejected the suggestion that an unlimited source of authority under the
Pogg Clause could be derived from the empire treaty power. In doing
so, he noted that although it was never contemplated that the Dominion
might have treaty-making powers, still it was "impossible" to strain
section 132 "so as to cover [that] uncontemplated event."'5 6 For
purposes of sections 91 and 92, Lord Atkin went on, "there is no such
thing as treaty legislation."'5 7 Observing that the division of powers is
"probably the most essential condition" of Canada's "inter-provincial
compact," he concluded that it would "undermine the constitutional
safeguards of Provincial constitutional autonomy" were the federal
government able to circumvent its conditions by entering into
agreements with foreign governments.' It followed, in his mind, that
152. Section 92(13), which grants the provinces jurisdiction over property and civil
rights, is roughly analogous to the state police power, in American constitutional
jurisprudence, with a subtraction for criminal law which, in Canada, is allocated to the
federal government under section 91(27) of the 1867 Constitution. See Appendix
(providing full text of section 92).
153. See Labour Conventions Case, [1937] A.C. at 351 (stating that "but for a remark
at the end of the judgment, which in view of the stated ground of the decision was
clearly obiter, the case could not be said to be an authority on the matter now under
discussion").
154. See id (referencing section 92(10)(a) and the Radio Reference's conclusion that
federal jurisdiction over broadcasting rested on section 92(10)(a), as well as the Pogg
Clause).
155. Id at 351.
156. Id at 350.
157. Id
158. Id. at 351-52.
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"no further legislative competence is obtained by Canada from its
accession to international status, and the consequent increase in the
scope of its executive functions."' 9 Otherwise, and "merely by making
promises to foreign countries," the Dominion could "clothe itself with
legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave it
birth.' ' "
In conclusion, the Privy Council softened the blow to the federal
government's newly acquired foreign relations power by explaining that
"[i]t must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada
is incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations."'' To
the contrary, Lord Atkin confirmed that "in totality of its legislative
powers ... she is fully equipped." '162 In fact, he saw little reason why the
ship of state could not sail on, exercising its watertight powers through
"co-operation between the Dominion and the Provinces.'' 63 Yet what
he meant by co-operation was unclear, and from this side of the
Atlantic, the Labour Conventions Case smacked of paternalism. At least
one critic was provoked to declare that "[s]o long as Canada clung to
the Imperial apron strings, her Parliament was all powerful in legislating
on Empire treaties," but "once she became a nation in her own right,
impotence descended."' 64
Despite the passage of time, the Labour Conventions Case remains
good law. 65 Unlike radio communications or aeronautics, treaty
implementation is not regarded as a gap in the division of powers,
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id at 353.
162. Id at 353-54.
163. Id. at 354.
164. F.R. Scott, Labour Conventions Case, 34 CAN. B. REV. 114,115 (1956); see also
V.C. MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution Seveno Years After, 15 CAN. B. REV. 401
(1956); N. Mackenzie, Canada and the Treaty-Making Power, 15 CAN B. REv. 436 (1956);
F.R. Scott, The Consequences of the Prity Council Decisions, 15 CAN. B. REv. 485 (1956)
(criticizing the Privy Council jurisprudence and the Labour Conventions Case in
particular).
165. SeeA.L.C. de Mestral, Treaoy Power andMore and Ruks and Obiter Dicta, 61 CAN.
B. REv. 856 (1983); Robert Howse, The Labour Conventions Doctrine in an Era of Global
Interdependence: Rethinking the Constitutional Dimensions of Canada's Extrnal Economic
Relations, 16 CAN. BUS. L.J. 160 (1990); Gibran van Ert, Using Treaties in Canadian Courts,
38 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 76-79 (2000) (discussing the Supreme Court of Canada's
treatment of the Labour Conventions Case).
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which confers authority on the federal government under the Pogg
Clause. As a result, courts must consider the subject matter of treaties
on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether domestic implementation
falls under federal or provincial jurisdiction. Today, there are two formal
constraints on the treaty power: the first, as discussed in this section,
arises from federalism and the division of powers; the second, which
concerns relations between the executive and legislative branches in
systems of parliamentary democracy, figures prominently in the next
part of the article on co-operative federalism. Before introducing that
concept, it is worth taking a moment to discuss Missouri v. Holland.'"
D. The Tenth Amendment's Invisible Radiation'
67
The question of limits on a nation's treaty powers is bound to arise
in federal systems which reserve certain powers to coordinate or
subordinate levels of government. It is hardly remarkable, then, to find
an analogy to the Labour Conventions Case in the American constitutional
jurisprudence. Less predictable, though, is the result in Missouri v.
Holland. There, the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion that the national
government could bind the states to international obligations in areas
of state autonomy168 is a shock to Canadian sensibilities. This brief
comment draws attention to three points in the opinion of Justice
Holmes, each of which stands in contrast to Lord Atkin's reasoning in
the Labour Conventions Case.
First, as noted above, the Privy Council resisted the proposition that
Canada's federal government could expand its legislative authority vis-a-
vis the provinces by making pacts with other countries." The issue in
Missouri v. Holland, which was decided several years before the Labour
Conventions Case, was whether the U.S. Congress could enact legislation
to protect migratory birds passing through and present in the territorial
jurisdiction of the states.17 1 Mirroring the submission in the Labour
Conventions Case that labour relations is within provincial jurisdiction,
Missouri based its challenge to the Migratory Birds Treaty Act on the
166. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
167. See id at 434.
168. See id at 419.
169. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
170. See Missouri, 252 U.S. 416.
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claim that ownership and control of the wild game within its borders
was a necessary incident of state sovereignty.'7' Thus, the state
maintained that "what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in
derogation of the powers reserved to the states, a treaty likewise cannot
do." '72 Though the Labour Conventions Case found for the provinces on
that point, Justice Holmes had little difficulty rejecting Missouri's
submission. 73 In his view, Article VI of the Constitution, and the
distinction it draws between federal statutes and treaties, provided a
complete answer. 74 Whereas acts of Congress are the supreme law of
the land "on/y when made in pursuance of the Constitution," treaties
have that status "when made under the authority of the United
States.' i7 It followed, then, that "[i]f the treaty is valid, there can be no
dispute about the va/idiy of the statute underArticle 1, Section 
8. ''176
Second, in the Labour Conventions Case, the Privy Council responded
cautiously to the suggestion that Canada's federal government should
have the authority to address issues of national concern or
dimensions. 77 Here too, the U.S. Supreme Court's remarks provide a
contrast. On this point, Justice Holmes stated that it should not lightly
be assumed that "in matters requiring national action, a power which must
belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is not to
be found.' 7 1 Claiming that a "national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude is involved," he held that the powers of the nations are
especially compelling "in cases where the states individually are
incompetent to act"; 179 "but for the treaties and the statute," Justice
Holmes concluded, "there might be no birds for any power to deal
with."'' " It is worth noting, in passing, that Canada's federal government
171. Se id at 432.
172. Id
173. Seeid at 433.
174. See id
175. Id (emphasis added) (stating, also, that "[wie do not mean to imply that there
are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a
different way'".
176. Id at 432 (emphasis added).
177. Lord Atkin's response to the argument that Canada would be incompetent
to conduct foreign relations was "co-operation" with the provinces. Se supra notes
161-63 and accompanying text.
178. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 435 (emphasizing the point by remarking, additionally, that "[tihe whole
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can legislate on issues of national concern when the provinces are
unable to regulate on their own.181 At the same time, legislation which
seeks to implement treaty obligations does not, for that reason alone,
satisfy the national concern criterion."2
Third, support for Missouri's position could not be found in any
textual powers explicitly granted or reserved to the states. Once again,
the Court found it significant that the Migratory Birds Treaty Act did
not contravene "any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution.""83 In effect, the state had attempted to set "some invisible
radiation" from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment up against
an Article VI treaty." Against a founding tradition of state autonomy,
Missouri v. Holland authorized the U.S. government to enter into treaties
that would compromise the powers of the states. Some years later, and
against the intent to create a strong federal government, the Labour
Conventions Case invalidated legislation which implemented treaty
obligations, because it violated Canada's division of powers. Nor does
the irony end there. Notwithstanding the Labour Conventions Case,
Canada has signed, ratified, and implemented an impressive number of
international human rights treaties.' Meanwhile, and despite Missouri
foundation of the state's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another state, and in one week a
thousand miles away').
181. See, e.g., R. v. Crown Zellerbach of Can., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (upholding
federal marine pollution legislation, despite its application to provincial waters, in part,
because of the "provincial inability" to regulate effectively); see aso Gen. Motors v. City
Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (upholding a federal civil remedy for anti-
competitive behaviour, under section 91(2)'s regulation of trade and commerce, in
part, because of the need for the national regulation of competition, in the face of the
provinces' inability to regulate effectively).
182. See van Ert, supra note 165, at 76.
183. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433.
184. Id at 434.
185. Treaties ratified by Canada include the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1976, see
supra notes 7 and 8; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 1949 Can. T.S. No. 27, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (in force
for Canada Dec. 2, 1952); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Sept. 3,1981,1982 Can. T.S. No. 31,1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (in force for Canada Jan. 9, 1982); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (CRSR), Apr. 22,1954,1969 Can. T.S. No. 6, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (in force for
Canada Sept. 2, 1969); International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD), Jan. 4,1969,1970 Can. T.S. No. 28, 660'U.N.T.S. 212
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v. Holland, the United States' record of participation in international
human rights treaties is disappointing.'
86
Two factors are vital in explaining this point of divergence between
Canada and the United States. First is the different status of the two
countries at the time their respective constitutions were written and,
second, are fundamental distinctions in the texts themselves. In
Canada's case, lack of sovereign status on foreign relations enabled
principles of federalism favourable to provincial autonomy to be
established before the text's failure to create a treaty power became a
question of constitutional interpretation. As for the United States, and
perhaps only from a Canadian perspective, Missouri v. Holland can be
explained by the importance the American constitutional text attaches
to the treaty power, in combination with the lack of any express list to
specify or concretize the claims of state autonomy. As it stands, and
though not without ongoing controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court
"authoritatively resolved" the relationship between federalism and
treaties in Missouri v. Holland, and "has never shown any inclination,
even in recent decisions, to reconsider that landmark decision."' 7
(in force for Canada Nov. 13,1970). Other significant treaties include: Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC), Sept. 2, 1990,1992 Can. T.S. No. 3,1577 U.N.T.S. 44
(in force for Canada Dec. 13,1991); and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), June 26, 1987, 1987 Can.
T.S. No. 36, 1465 U.N.T.S. 111 (in force for Canada July 24, 1987). For a more
complete list see ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: USE IN
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS LITIGATION 23-24 n.2 (1992).
186. Examples include: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of GenocideJan. 12, 1951,78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United
States on Feb. 23, 1989, with reservations and understandings); CAT, June 26, 1987,
14 U.N.T.S. 111, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (entered into force for
the United States Nov. 20, 1994, with reservations and declarations); CERD, Jan. 4,
1969, 600 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force for the United States
Nov. 20,1994, with declarations, statements, and reservations); ICCPR, Mar. 23,1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force for the United States Sept.
8, 1992, with declarations and understandings). See Bell, supra note 6, at 255-56
(describing the tension between its federal structure and human rights law a s a "zero-
sum relationship" in the U.S.); see also id at 272-76 (explaining the history of human
rights treaties in the U.S. in more detail).
187. David M. Golove, Traty-Makin, and the Nation: The Histoirical Foundations of the
Nationalist Conception of the Trea_* Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2000) (defending
the "nationalist view" of Missouri and the treaty power). See contra Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power and American Federalirm, 97 MICH. L. REV. 391 (1998) (critiquing the
"nationalist view); Curtis A. Bradley, The Trea.* Power andAmerican Federalism Part II,
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E. Conclution
This analysis of Canadian constitutionalism has illustrated the
enduring impact of dominion status and related it, in the context of
treaty-making, to the evolution of federalism. What independence in
foreign relations the Statute of Westminster granted, the Privy Council
arguably took away through its concept of watertight compartments.
How Canada managed to participate in international rights treaties,
without violating the sacrosanct compartments of federalism, is the
subject of the next section.
III. CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
A. In Totaliy of Canada's L4gislative Poweri 8
International entitlements arrived in Canada before domestic
constitutional rights. Over the years this country has signed and ratified
no less than thirty-eight principal human rights treaties and instruments
containing significant human rights components." 9 Pursuant to many
of those agreements, Canada has submitted compliance reports which
catalogue the country's record under each and every article, in
unabridged detail.' 9° In addition, Canada has signed the Optional
Protocol under the ICCPR which recognizes the HRC's jurisdiction to
receive and consider "communications" from individuals who claim
that their country is in violation of their rights under the Covenant.'
99 MiCH. L. REv. 98 (2000) (replying directly to Golove's Treaoy-Making and the Nation).
188. Labour Conventions Case, [1937] A.C. 326, 353-54 (suggesting that federalism
is not a constraint on the implementation of treaty obligations, providing the
Dominion and provinces co-operated to exercise the totality of Canada's legislative
powers); see also mpra note 162 and accompanying text.
189. See spra note 185.
190. Reports are required under the ICCPR, spra note 7, art. 40 at 172, 181, and
the ICESCR, spra note 8, art.16-17 at 4, 9. See also, CRC, supra note 185, art. 44 at 59;
CAT, supra note 185, art. 24 at 121; CEDAW, supra note 185, art. 18 at 22; CERD,
supra note 185, art. 13 at 230.
191. See ICCPR, (First) Optional Protocol, Dec. 19, 1976,99 U.N.T.S. 172, 1976
Can. T.S. No. 47; acceded to by Canada pursuant to Privy Council Decision No. 1976-
1156, May 18, 1976. In addition, Canada in 1989 made an "Article 22 declaration"
under the CAT, thereby recognizing the Committee's competence to receive and hear
communications on behalf of individuals. For a description of the process for
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While its record of compliance with the decisions of such bodies is
uneven, Canada has been an active participant in this process.
92
On the domestic front, constitutional rights, much like Canada's
system of government, also took the form of a hybrid. Modeled partly
on the American Bill of Rights, Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms also followed the patterns of international and other
transnational instruments.'93 Against that background, international law
has played a significant role in the Charter jurisprudence to date.' Far
from diminishing as the Charter evolves, the Supreme Court of
Canada's reliance on international entitlements continues to rise."
This section explains how Canada exercised the totality of its
legislative powers, in making and implementing rights treaties through
a process of co-operation between the federal government and
provinces. In this regard, it might appear on first impression that
Canada has more than met the expectations of Articles 50 of the ICCPR
and 28 of the ISESCR, respectively, which maintain that international
entitlements are indifferent to the obstacles of federalism.' As noted
in the Introduction, however, her performance under these Covenants
is imperfect, and dissatisfaction persists. Without promising
"communications" or complaints under these instruments, see Sharryn Aiken & Tom
Clark, InternationalProadurrfor Protecuting the Human Rigbts ofNon-Citiens, 10 J.L. & Soc.
POL'Y 182 (1994).
192. See Aiken & Clark, supra note 191, at 184.
193. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 185, at 33-49 (providing a short account of the
ways international sources influenced the Charter's drafting); and WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER 11
(2d ed. 1996) (claiming that the "rich influence of international sources in the final
version of the Canadian Charter is uncontested').
194. In 1996, Schabas reported that Canadian courts had cited international
agreements more than 400 times in decisions interpreting the Charter. See SCHABAS,
supra note 193, at 13; see also Appendix (providing a list).
195. See, e.g., Suresh v. Canada, [2002J 4 D.L.R. 208 (relying on international law
in proceedings to deport an alleged terrorist to conclude that refoulement to face a risk
of torture violated the Charter's principle of fundamental justice); Spraytech, Soci&ti
d'arrosage v. Town of Hudson, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 (invoking international laws
"precautionary principle" to uphold a municipality's pesticide law); Baker v. Minister
of Citizenship & Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (concluding that an administrative
decision-maker unlawfully exercised the Minister's discretion in deportation
proceedings by failing to consider Canada's unimplemented treaty obligations under
the CRC).
196. See ICCPR, supra note 7, and ISESCR, supra note 8.
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conclusions, this section considers whether, and to what extent, this
shortfall can be attributed to federalism.
B. The Most Innovative Dimension of the Confederation Settkment' g7
Co-operative federalism did not have its genesis in the Labour
Conventions Case and the constraints it placed on the federal
government's treaty power."g Albeit in other forms, this process
predated the kind of co-operation between levels of government that
Lord Atkin called for as Canada's ship of state sailed into the foreign
waters of independent status.'" By the time international rights treaties
emerged many years later, the mechanism which is known as co-
operative federalism had evolved. Through a process of co-operation
or dialogue between the federal government and the provinces, Canada
overcame the Labour Conventions Case constraint and undertook treaty
obligations which bridged the constitutional division of powers.
Like so much else in Canadian constitutionalism, co-operative
federalism adapted basic principles of parliamentary government to
local circumstances. An understanding of this form of co-operation
begins with the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches in parliamentary democracies. Far from being separated, as in
the United States, the two branches are "fused" in such systems of
government. In a departure from America's model of republican
government, the political party with a majority of seats in the legislature
forms the government in parliamentary systems; meantime, the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, who comprise the executive, are elected members
of the legislature." More generally, parliamentary government operates
under the principles of "responsible government," two of which are of
particular interest here."° One is that the Prime Minister and Cabinet
control the legislature, as long as that branch expresses "confidence" in
197. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
198. See Kathy Brock, The End of Exemaive Federalism?, in NEW TRENDS IN
CANADIAN FEDERALISM 95-102 (Fran~oise Rocher & Miriam Catherine Smith eds.,
1995) (organizing the history of co-operative or "executive" federalism into four
periods of evolution).
199. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
200. See genera/4 MONAHAN, spra note 88, at 56-84 (describing the 1867
Constitution's framework of executive and legislative power).
201. Seegeeral4 id at 68-76 (discussing responsible government).
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the executive by enacting its measures and supporting its policies.2' The
other is that the Prime Minister and Cabinet are in turn responsible, or
accountable, to the legislative branch, and can be defeated by a motion
of "no confidence."
20 3
In a British system of parliamentary government, the executive and
legislative branches perform distinct functions in relation to treaties. W
Thus there are no constraints on the executive's power to enter into
agreements with foreign countries; the authority to do so is a Crown
prerogative which does not require legislative approval for its exercise. 
2
0
Consequendy, treaties entered into by the executive bind the state,
whether or not the legislature thereafter enacts implementing
legislation.' As Lord Atkin explained in the Labour Conventions Case,
"Parliament will either fulfil or not treaty obligations imposed upon the
State by its executive. 20 7 To put it another way, while obligations signed
by the executive "bind the State as against other contracting parties,
Parliament may refuse to perform them and so leave the State in
default.""20
These principles of parliamentary government apply to Canada, with
the qualifications that were necessary to accommodate the division of
powers. Because she lacked independence in foreign relations, section
132 of the 1867 Constitution did not empower Canada either to enter
into or to implement treaties domestically in her own name.2' Though
the Labomr Conventions Case declined to consider whether Canada could
claim the authority to make treaties, it is now settled that Parliament can
enter into international agreements, as an aspect of the Crown
202. See id
203. Se id at 71-73.
204. Parliamentary systems do not draw a distinction between executing and non-
self-executing treaties, because treaties are not incorporated into domestic law without
legislative implementation. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
205. See van Ert, spra note 165, at 10-12.
206. See id. at 12-13.
207. Labour Convention Case, [1937] A.C. 326, 348. See van Ert, mpra note 165, at
13 (explaining that to treat international conventions as binding domestic law, without
legislative implementation, would confer a power to make law on the Crown, contrary
to the principles of self-government).
208. Id See gmeralb ALLAN GOTLIEB, CANADIAN TREATY-MAKING (1968)
(providing an overview of treaty powers), and HOGG, mpra note 13, at 289-306
(discussing treaties).
209. See supra note 58.
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prerogative."' As for their implementation, the Privy Council held that
the federal government only has the legislative authority to implement
treaty obligations that fall within its constitutional jurisdiction. By way
of example, covenants and agreements that depend for their
implementation on any of section 91's sources of authority, including
the Pogg Clause, can be addressed by Parliament, without consultation
or negotiation with the provinces.
2 11
What the federal legislature cannot do is unilaterally implement
international obligations that fall within provincial jurisdiction. As Lord
Atkin noted in the Labour Conventions Case, under Canada's scheme of
parliamentary federalism the obligations imposed by the treaty would
"have to be performed if at all, by several Legislatures," and that meant
the federal executive would have to secure the "legislative assent not of
the one Parliament to whom they may be responsible, but possibly of
several Parliaments to whom they stand in no direct relation." '212 For
purposes of human rights treaties, the problem is that Canada's
provinces are granted exclusive jurisdiction in key areas including health,
education, housing, and most aspects of social welfare, which are the
subject of many international entitlements.2 3 Under Canada's division
of powers, their implementation might require federal legislation,
provincial action, or some combination of the two. From the
perspective of the federal government, there may be little point entering
into international agreements that cannot be performed. At the same
time, the provinces may choose to comply with international norms, but
are not obligated to do so as a matter of domestic constitutional law.
Accordingly, Canada was only able to exercise the "totality" of her
sovereign powers in human rights through a process of consultation,
co-operation, and negotiation between the federal government and the
210. See HOGG, ssmpra note 13, at 290 (detailing the instrument that delegated
Britain's prerogative powers over foreign affairs to the Governor General of Canada).
211. See, e.g., with reference to section 91(27)'s criminal law power, Criminal Code,
R.S.C. ch. 10, § 269.1 (3d Supp.), § 2 (1980) (Can.) (implementing CAT by making
torture a criminal offence in Canada); Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 11, % 318-19 (1st
Supp.), § 1 (Can.) (complying with CERD by criminalizing hate propaganda).
212. HOGG, .rpra note 13, at 348-49.
213. See, e.g., ICESCR, sspra note 8 (guaranteeing the right to work (art. 6); the
right to form trade unions (art. 8); rights pertaining to the family (art. 10); the right to
an adequate standard of living (art. 11); the right to the highest attainable standard of
health (art. 12); the right to education (art. 13); and the right to participate in cultural
and other activities (art. 15)).
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provinces. More generally, this process describes a relationship between
the executive branches of the two levels of government and is also
referred to as "executive federalism." '214 The relationship is one of direct
negotiation between the "First Ministers" of the federal government
and the provinces, and its object is to forge agreement on issues over
which neither level of government has exclusive control or
jurisdiction.21 Co-operation attained such importance in Canadian
federalism that Donald Smiley was prompted to declare that, "[t]he
most innovative dimension of the Confederation settlement was the
combination of federalism . . . [and] the Westminster mode of
parliamentary responsible government.12 16 The synergy between
federalism and parliamentary government has two parts. The first,
which addressed the demands of federalism, recognized that federal-
provincial consultation is necessary, not only because of the
interdependence of Canada's two levels of government, but also,
because of the "legacy of the provincial rights movement.
' 217
The recent history of constitutional reform and patriation provides
a compelling example of that dynamic. At the time Canada's federal
government threatened to patriate the Constitution unilaterally, eight
objecting provinces invoked a "convention" to challenge then Prime
Minister Trudeau's proposed plan of action.21' As seen above, Great
Britain had promised not to amend the Constitution without Canada's
consent, and by the same token, the domestic practice was that the
federal government would not seek amendments to the Constitution
without the consent of the provinces.219 The Pa'tiaion Reference asked the
214. Kathy Brock provides a good summary:
[E]xecutive federalism refers to the arrangements used to negotiate
agreements between the two levels of government for the provision of
programs, services, and the coordination of policies. The results vary from
agreements on fiscal arrangements and transfers from the federal
government to the provincial governments to the harmonization and similar
provision of health services within the provinces, to the reduction of
interprovincial trade barriers, to constitutional amendments, and more.
Brock, supra note 198, at 93.
215. HOGG, supra note 13, at 136-42 (describing the process of intergovernmental
relations).
216. DONALD V. SMILEY, THE FEDERAL CONDrION IN CANADA 40 (1987).
217. Brock, sxpra note 198, at 93.
218. Patiaion Refernce, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
219. See spra note 43 and accompanying text. While the convention that Great
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Supreme Court of Canada to decide whether provincial consent was
required, either by law or by constitutional convention, for amendments
to the Constitution. "2 Enigmatically, a majority held that the federal
government had the formal legal authority to proceed unilaterally, and
also, though by a differently constituted majority, that it would be
unconstitutional, in the conventional but legally unenforceable sense,
for Canada to seek amendments without provincial consent."2 In the
event, negotiations resumed until all provinces but Quebec accepted the
patriation package.' 2 For purposes of this article, two lessons emerge
from the Patriation Refirence's example. The first is that, absent an
amending formula, changes to the Constitution required co-operation
and near unanimous agreement between the two levels of government.
The second is that even though the federal government's unilateral
reforms were "legal," it was problematic, as a matter of legitimacy, to
proceed without the consent of the provinces.'
The second element of co-operative federalism, which made it
viable as a solution to the obstacles of federalism, is parliamentary
government's fusing of the executive and legislative branches. In effect,
the Prime Minister and his provincial counterparts, the Premiers, have
"the power and capacity to execute agreements through their legislative
assemblies." 4 According to Smiley, "[tihe most elemental and
persisting tradition of the Canadian constitutional system is executive
dominance," both at the center and in the provinces." Because the
executive controls the Legislature until the confidence of that branch is
lost, the First Ministers could consult and negotiate agreements in the
expectation that any accords reached would be approved and
Britain would not amend without Canada's consent was accepted, any further
convention of Canadian federalism on the question ofwhether provincial consent was
constitutionally required, was more controversial.
220. Sue Patriation Reference, 119811 1 S.C.R. 753. On the subject of conventions, s
generaly MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (1986).
221. See supra note 218. The Court failed to indicate what degree of provincial
consent was constitutionally required and, more specifically, whether the requirement
was one of unanimity.
222. See supra note 52.
223. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining subsequent attempts at
constitutional reform, which were intended to remedy Quebec's perceived conclusion,
and which failed).
224. Brock, supra note 198, at 94.
225. SMILEY, supra note 216, at 59.
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implemented by their respective legislatures. Co-operative federalism




Though it belongs to the political realm and is not legally
enforceable, the practice of co-operative federalism is ingrained in the
Canadian tradition. It describes an ongoing process which runs the
gamut from constitutional reform to fiscal arrangements to health care,
and can encompass practically any issue of mutual interest to the federal
government and the provinces, including the ratification and
implementation of human rights treaties. 27 Hence the declaration that
"[i]n 1966, there were almost as many formally scheduled federal-
provincial conferences of some kind or other as there were days in the
year." 2 It is said that "more than any other federation," Canada relies
on intergovernmental negotiation to solve differences between its two
levels of government.229 A mechanism that can falter has nonetheless
been effective in breaking the deadlock of divided jurisdiction under the
constitutional text." °
At the level of comparison, it is difficult to imagine how co-
operation could work in the United States. Without suggesting that co-
operation between the U.S. government and the states is an
impossibility, negotiating the terms of federalism works in Canada
because the numbers involved, while cumbersome, are at least
226. But see infra note 230.
227. If the federal government has the power to set conditions on the expenditure
of its money at the local level, the strength of provincial autonomy as a dynamic of
Canadian federalism cannot be forgotten. Despite the central government's power of
the purse, the terms of "fiscal federalism" are regularly discussed and negotiated by the
federal and provincial parties. See gneral, HOGG, supra note 13, at 143-66 (explaining
the financial arrangements of Confederation and federal-provincial interdependence).
228. WILLIAM R. LEDERMAN, CONTINUING CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMAS: ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, PUBLIC LAW AND FEDERAL
SYSTEM OF CANADA 335 (1981).
229. See SMILEY, nrpra note 216, at 83 (quoting Michael Jenkins).
230. The Meech Lake Accord (MLA) may be yet the most poignant example of
failure. There, the institution of executive federalism negotiated amendments to the
Constitution which were intended to ameliorate Quebec's grievances arising from the
1982 patriation exercise. Adopted unanimously in 1987 by all First Ministers, the MLA
failed for want of legislative ratification within the three year period the document
prescribed for ratification. See general, MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE ACCORD: THE
INSIDE STORY, spra note 53, at 6 (explaining that one of the reasons for its failure was
that "the 'executive federalism' model of constitutional change is no longer viable").
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manageable. As well, there are significant differences in the relationships
between executive and legislative power in the two systems of
government. In success and in failure, Canada has found ways to
maneuver around the constraints of its textual division of powers,
including the lack of a treaty power.
231
There, the doctrine of watertight compartments between sections
91 and 92 placed constitutional restrictions on the federal government's
authority to undertake international and transnational obligations.
Without co-operation and negotiation between the two levels of
government, Canada's participation in human rights treaties would have
been severely circumscribed. 2 Joint participation in international
human rights began with the Federal-Provincial Ministerial Conference
on Human Rights in 1975, and was followed by the establishment of a
permanent mechanism for federal, provincial, and territorial
consultation on human rights.33 As a result, Canada's ratification of
human rights agreements carries the express agreement of the
provinces, as well as of the federal government. 2 4 More a byproduct
than a primary purpose of co-operative federalism, treaty
implementation is an important and a beneficial aspect of it just the
same. It is also significant that the spirit of co-operation is not limited
to the ratification decision but extends to the requirements of
compliance reporting."5 There, it is Canada's practice to submit lengthy
reports with submissions, not only from the federal government but the
231. See Brock, supra note 198, at 103 (claiming that " [ejxecutive federalism as the
engine of the machinery to resolve conflicts between the federal and provincial
governments in Canada has sputtered, coughed, and stalled at times, but it has
generally seen Canada through turbulent periods").
232. See stpra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (explaining that the federal
government can enter into treaties, but can only implement such treaties in areas of
exclusive federal jurisdiction).
233. -See Bell, supra note 6, at 266-70 (explaining the mandate of the Federal-
Provincial-Territorial Continuing Committee on Human Rights).
234. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 185, at 50-53 (describing the process of federal-
provincial consultation leading up to the ratification of human rights treaties). For
example, Canada acceded to the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1976 "after consulting all the
provinces and getting their undertaking to implement the covenants to the extent that
they would be within [provincial] jurisdiction." Id at 51.
235. See Bell, .rupra note 6, at 268 (stating that Canada's reports have been the most
complete of any member state, and that the United Nations has referred to them as
models for the international community). Butsee infra note 225 and accompanying text.
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provinces and territories as well.z'
C. More than Mere Pmfessions of Nobk Sentiment?7
In many ways, Canada is a model for the ICCPR and ICESCR's
direction that the Covenants' provisions apply without adjustments for
federalism.238 Its leadership is evident in Canada's record of ratifying
human rights agreements and its earnest compliance with reporting
requirements. On the positive side, when all levels of government
prepare a formal report, there is upward pressure on the protection of
rights.39 Few governments want to be singled out as a transgressor of
international human rights in a report that will be publicized and
evaluated internationally. Still, the question is whether these co-
operative efforts amount to "more than mere professions of noble
sentiments."'
Its Fourth Report would have the HRC believe that Canada takes
its obligations under the ICCPR very seriously, and that "Canada strives
to meet and exceed the human rights standards" of the ICCPR.241 In all
modesty, the Report went on in its conclusion to admit that the
protection of human rights "demands continuing vigilance and
determination" and that, "[als much as we have done," there is
"undoubtedly more that could and should be done."242 Despite
Canada's declarations of respect for the Covenant and its process of
review, the HRC did not hesitate to provide a list of deficiencies in her
236. See Bell, supra note 6, at 267 (explaining that the Committee's mandate
provides that each provincial and territorial government is entitled to prepare its own
report and to send a representative to meeting's discussing Canada's reports).
237. See SCHABAS, supra note 191, at 8 (commenting that when the ICCPR and
ICESCR were entered into force, the obligations Canada had undertaken were "more
than mere professions of noble sentiments").
238. See supra note 9.
239. See Bell, supra note 6, at 286-87 (suggesting that Canada's "dialectical
federalism" grants the provinces a share of the responsibility for human rights, engages
them in the creative process of negotiation, adoption, and implementation, and gives
than a "meaningful role" in Canada's human rights leadership).
240. SC-IABAS, supra note 193.
241. Canada's Fourth Report Under the International Covenant of CGtil and Pol'tical Rights,
on file at THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW.
242. Id
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performance.243 As one commentator remarked, the Concluding
Observations "broke new ground by focusing on the extent to which
increasing poverty among disadvantaged groups in so affluent a country
as Canada engages not only social and economic but civil and political
rights." 2"
The CESCR's review of Canada's third periodic report was yet more
negative. 24 After complaining that "too many questions failed to receive
detailed or specific answers," the CESCR noted a handful of "Positive
Aspects" before outlining more than two dozen "Principal Subjects of
Concern."'24 In its list of "Suggestions and Recommendations," the
CESCR stated that "since there is generally in Canada a lack of public
awareness about human rights treaty obligations, the general public,
public institutions and officers at all kvls of Government should be made
aware [of the State Party's obligations]."247
The CESCR review commanded "considerable attention
internationally as well as domestically" because it indicated a "new
resolve .. .to hold affluent countries accountable to standards of
progressive realization."'2 At home, the government's reaction, or lack
thereof, infuriated advocates of international human rights. According
to some, the problem is that Canada refuses to see itself as a violator of
rights.249 After promoting the treaty monitoring system and urging other
countries to comply, Canada responded to criticism by questioning "the
credibility of the review. ' 211 It is an attitude that for others to condemn
Canada for failing to maximize social and economic entitlements is
unfair, especially when those who sit in judgment represent countries
243. Condud'g Observations of HRC, supra note 16, at 7-20 (specifying "principal
areas of concern and recommendations").
244. Bruce Porter, Juging Poverty: Uing International Human Rights Law to Refine the
Scope of Charter Rights, 15 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 117, 134 (2000).
245. See Scott, supra note 17, at 101-04 (arranging the "common findings," by the
HRC and CESCR, of Canada's non-compliance under these headings: inadequacy of
remedies in Canada's legal system for violations of rights in the Covenants; indigenous
rights; homelessness and poverty in general; and violation of rights to freedom of
association of "workfare" recipients; in addition, he provides examples of other
findings of non-compliance, respectively, under the ICCPR and the ICESCR).
246. Concluding Observations of CESCR, supra note 15, paras. 2, 14-39.
247. Id para. 58 (emphasis added).
248. Porter, supra note 244, at 130.
249. See id at 119.
250. Id at 132.
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where dire poverty, or other social ills, are an extreme problem.2"' In
blunt terms, "How dare upstart UN bodies (which include, by the way,
experts from states with truly bad human rights records) compromise
our sovereignty by challenging our self-image of purity on the human
rights front?"2 2 For Craig Scott, Canada's lack of commitment to the
international rule of law can be described as a "mix of disingenuous
complacency, inconsistency and hypocrisy."2 3 In this he may be right
that Canada is quick to trumpet its contributions to the international
order, and then to ignore on scrutiny of its own record of compliance.
Scott maintains that international rights law has "lived a life outside the
spotlight of both legal scrutiny and political debate," which matches
"the near invisibility and powerlessness of those members of society
who would most benefit from having those rights taken more seriously
by our legal and political orders."
254
It remains unclear whether and to what extent the shortfall, and the
bitter disappointment it has generated, can be attributed to federalism.
At the level of process, it stands to reason that compliance reporting
will be more complicated in federal states. For instance, as noted above,
when the provinces included their own reports, the CEDAW
complained that the format made Canada's level of compliance difficult
to analyze and evaluate.255 Meanwhile, the HRC expressed its concern
that "the delegation was not able to give up-to-date answers or
information about compliance with the Covenant by the provincial
authorities. '2 6 If it is difficult to include all levels of government in the
compliance process, it would be impossible for the federal government
to submit a single report which purported to speak for all of Canada,
including its provinces and territories.
As for the substance of compliance, the CESCR's most recent
Concluding Observations once again pointed to the problems associated
251. See id
252. Scott, supra note 17, at 104.
253. Id
254. Id
255. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 185; see also Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 29 Feb. 1007, A/52/38/Rev. 1, para. 318
(complaining that the format of Canada's reports, broken down by provinces, was
difficult to analyze and evaluate), para. 338 (suggesting that the next report from
Canada integrate the information from federal and provincial levels, article by article).
256. Concluding Observations of HRC, supra note 16, para. 2.
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with federalism. s" There, the Committee stated that, as a matter of
record, it heard "ample evidence" that Canada's "complex federal
system presents obstacles to implementing the Covenant in areas of
provincial jurisdiction."2 8 Undeterred by those submissions, the
CESCR stated its "regret" that unless a Covenant right is protected by
the Charter, embodied in federal-provincial agreements, "or
incorporated directly into provincial law," relief would be unavailable
where provinces failed to implement the Covenant." 9 In other words,
the CESCR was unimpressed by the excuses made in the name of
federalism. Accordingly, after noting that Canada's delegation had
emphasized the importance of "political processes" which "were often
complex," the Committee urged the federal government to take
"concrete steps" "to ensure that the provinces and territories are" aware
of their "obligations under the Covenant" and to ensure that such
obligations and entitlements "are enforceable within the provinces and
territories."2" To emphasize the point, the Committee's suggestions and
recommendations were addressed to all levels of government of
Canada.
Because many of the subjects of concern identified and addressed
by the HRC and CESCR fall within provincial jurisdiction, the federal
government can deflect criticism of Canada's failure to meet
expectations by pointing the finger at the provinces. If Canada's
commitment to the protection of international human rights is
imperfect, it is unavoidable that at least some of the deficiencies can be
attributed to the Constitution's division of powers. However, there is
more to it than that, and it remains open to question what Canada's
performance would look like under a unitary system, where its progress
would not be impeded by the obstacles arising from federalism.
Questions of legitimacy, which are inherent in any implementation
or enforcement of international standards, have yet to be fully ventilated
in Canada. The fact of ratification binds the signatory to the obligations
set out in the treaty. Yet whether those obligations have been
performed and can be enforced against a party in breach is another
matter. Resistance to international law's imposition of limits on a
257. See ,eneralb Concluding Observations of CESC. supra note 15, para. 12.
258. Id
259. Id
260. Id at para. 52.
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nation's sovereignty is as old as international law itself. In Canada, the
question of legitimacy has dual contexts.
As explained above, the executive branch in parliamentary systems
has the authority to conclude international agreements without the
legislature's participation.26 Although the Prime Minister and Cabinet
can normally count on Parliament to enact whatever laws are necessary
to incorporate treaty obligations into domestic law, it is the legislature's
choice, as a matter of democratic prerogative, to do so or not.
262 The
complication in Canada's case, is the federal system and its division of
powers. There, co-operative federalism facilitated a process of
consultation with the provinces and territories, which overcame the
constitutional obstacles of treaty-making and implementation in the area
of human rights, and avoided the prospect of the federal government
undertaking obligations without a mandate to do so from the provinces.
Even so, the shortfall between Canada's obligations and its performance
remains.
263
A second context for the legitimacy issue has opened up under
Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In interpreting constitutional
rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has relied freely on international
human rights law.2' The difficulty, however, is that the jurisprudence
does not clearly distinguish between those obligations which are
incorporated into domestic law and those which are not.265 Yet is it risky
for the Court to proceed as though ratification is sufficient, in and of
itself, to align rights entitlements with Canadian values.2' It is
261. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038,1051
(suggesting that "[tihe content of Canada's international human rights obligations is
... an important indicia of the meaning of the 'full benefit of the Charters protection,"'
and suggesting that the Charter should "generally be presumed to provide protection
at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights
documents which Canada has ratified" (emphasis added)).
266. See., e.g., Baker v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817
(invoking the CRC, an unincorporated treaty, in defining the scope of a statutory
discretion), and van Ert, .rupra note 165, at 46-61 (discussing Baker), 48 (stating that
"[wihile the majority denied that they had set aside the implementation requirement,
they did not deny having recognized domestic legal consequences arising from the
unimplemented treaty").
20021
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
problematic for the Court to ratchet a statutory provision or Charter
provision up, in reliance on an unincorporated treaty obligation. First,
the process of translating an international entitlement, whose content
may be general or aspirational, by means that are vetted through the
parliamentary process, is bypassed.267 Second, in doing so, the Court
appropriates to itself an authority that it has not exercised traditionally
and which is not explicit in the text of the Charter: the power to
determine when, how, to what extent and by what means, international
obligations will be implemented domestically.'
Like the Charter itself, which recently celebrated its twentieth
anniversary, the literature on judicial review is as yet young.269 One
aspect of the Supreme Court of Canada's mandate to enforce the
Charter deserves greater attention, and that is its use of international
human rights law. It is an element of Charter interpretation, and of the
emerging debate about relations between the courts and the legislatures,
that should neither be taken for granted nor ignored.27
267. As justice Iacobucci noted in his dissent on this point in Baker, the courts
should proceed with caution, lest they "adversely affect the balance maintained by our
Parliamentary tradition, or inadvertently grant the executive the power to bind citizens
without the necessity of involving the legislative branch." Baker, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 865-
66. The risk is that the party invoking international law would be able to achieve
indirectly what could not be achieved directly, namely, "to give force and effect within
the domestic legal system to international obligations undertaken by the executive
alone that have yet to be subject to the democratic will of Parliament." Id
268. Butsee id. (stating that injustice Iacobucci's view Baker might not have been
the same had the case fallen under the Charter and Shu'gbhs interpretive assumption
that administrative discretion involving Charter rights must be exercised in accordance
with Canada's international obligations).
269. See., e.g., KENTROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL:JUDICIALACTIViSM
OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001); CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDIJUDCIAL POWER
AND THE CHARTER: CANADA AND THE PARADOX OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
(McLlland & Stewart Inc. 1993); F. L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER
REVOLUTION & THE COURT PARTY (2000) (advancing disparate views of judicial
review under the Charter).
270. But see van Ert, supra note 165, at 79-85 (urging an exception to legislative
implementation for human rights treaties, on grounds of their universality, suggesting
that Canadian courts should forcefully apply the treaty presumption to ratified, but
unimplemented, treaties, and claiming that, for Canadian courts not to incorporate
conceptions of humanity that are recognized as universal in international law "comes




Canada's record of performance in ratifying and implementing
international human rights instruments may not be perfect, but it is at
least enviable. Not only has Canada become a State Party to key
agreements, she has accepted Optional Protocols which permit her own
nationals to seek recourse in international forums, and has been in
earnest compliance with the reporting requirements of various
instruments. The declaration that Canada "does take her obligations
very seriously" can be taken at face value.
The record that has been briefly described above would be
noteworthy without the complication of federalism. Yet, the 1867
Constitution failed to create a treaty power, and when Canada achieved
sovereignty in foreign relations, the division of powers and Lord Atkin's
"watertight compartments" metaphor almost immediately compromised
the federal government's ability to function effectively. Fortunately
though, by the time international human rights agreements emerged,
Canadian constitutionalism had discovered the need for flexible and
pragmatic solutions to overlapping jurisdiction between the federal and
provincial governments. In due course, Canada ratified a number of
human rights treaties through the process of co-operative federalism.
Not only did she overcome the constraints of federalism, her ratification
exemplified a spirit of co-operation which meant that all provinces were
given an opportunity to participate actively in treaty-making,
implementation, and compliance reporting.
Still, Canada cannot claim that she has achieved the goals of the
ICCPR and ICESCR. This is why human rights advocates complain
about the lack of commitment, both federal and provincial, to the
obligations Canada undertook in ratifying these agreements. As noted
above, however, there are questions of legitimacy and accountability
regarding any contention that Canada has absolute obligations under
treaties which are monitored by bodies that are not in any way
accountable to the Canadian electorate. Few democracies would ratify
agreements that derogated the authority to decide questions of
entitlement to an extra-territorial body that is not representative of or
accountable to the electorate.
There can be no doubt that federalism continues to affect treaty
implementation in Canada. While the provinces may all have agreed to
the ICESCR, implementation raises a host of questions that must be
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addressed and resolved as a matter of political or democratic choice. At
least in Canada, questions about the kind and level of social and
economic entitlements provided by the state is a matter of democratic
prerogative. It is not surprising to learn, in such circumstances, that
different provinces adopt different policies on any number of questions.
Therefore, federalism cuts both ways for international human rights
in Canada. Though the division of powers restricted the federal
government's authority, over time the result has been positive because
human rights treaties, when signed by Canada, carry the authority and
commitment of the provinces as well. Ratification takes place only after
federal-provincial consultation, and the provinces also participate in
Canada's periodic reports. Not only does this create upward pressure on
the protection of human rights, it generates a process or dialogue which
seeks to reconcile international entitlements with the local
circumstances of Canadian democracy. If federalism can be blamed for
Canada's failure to do better, it is arguable that the division of powers
has contributed to a stronger awareness of, and commitment to, the




THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (Eng.)
(Renamed The Constitution Act, 1867
1982, c. 11, S 53(2) (Eng.))
PREAMBLE
An Act for the Union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and
the Government thereof; and for Purposes connected therewith.
(29th March, 1867.)
WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into
One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireand, with a Constitution similar in Principle
to that of the United Kingdom:
And whereas such a Union would conduce to the Welfare
of the Provinces and promote the Interests of the British
Empire:
And whereas on the Establishment of the Union by
Authority of Parliament it is expedient, not only that the
Constitution of the Legislative Authority in the Dominion be
provided for, but also that the Nature of the Executive
Government therein be declared:
And whereas it is expedient that Provision be made for the
eventual Admission into the Union of other Parts of British
North America-
Be it therefore enacted and declared by the Queen's most
Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present
Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, as
follows:
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VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Powers of the Parliament
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate and the House of Commons, to make Laws
for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation
to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act
assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for
greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the
foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that
(notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative
Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming
within the Classes of Subjects herein-after enumerated; that is to
say-
1. Repealed.
1a.The Public Debt and Property.
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
2a. Unemployment insurance.
3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation.
4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit.
5. Postal Service.
6. The Census and Statistics.
7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.
8. The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of
Civil and other Officers of the Government of Canada.
9. Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island.
10. Navigation and Shipping.
11. Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine
Hospitals.
12. Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries.
13. Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country,
or between Two Provinces.
14. Currency and Coinage.
15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.
16. Savings Banks.
17. Weights and Measures.





21. Bankruptcy and Insolvency.
22. Patents of Invention and Discovery.
23. Copyrights.
24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.
25. Naturalization and Aliens.
26. Marriage and Divorce.
27. The Criminal Law, except for the Constitution of Courts of
Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.
28. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of
Penitentiaries.
29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects
enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the
Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively
to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
Exclusive Powers of ProindalItgislatums
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in
relation to matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next
herein-after enumerated; that is to say-
1. Repealed.
2. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a
Revenue for Provincial Purposes.
3. The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province.
4. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the
Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers.
5. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the
Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.
6. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Public and
Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province.
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals,
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Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the
Province, other than Marine Hospitals.
8. Municipal Institutions in the Province.
9. Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to
the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.
10. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the
following Classes-
a. Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs,
and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with
any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the
Limits of the Province:
b. Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or
Foreign Country:
c. Such Works as, although wholely situate within the Province,
are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of
Canada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the
Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces.
11. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects.
12. The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province.
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts,
both of Civil and of CriminalJurisdiction, and including Procedure
in Civil Matters in those Courts.
15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or
Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in
relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects
enumerated in this Section.




IX. - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
General.
132. The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have
all Powers necessary or proper for performing the
Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries,
arising under Treaties between the Empire and such
Foreign Countries.

